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Tender Offers: Safeguards and
Restraints - An Interest Analysis
Alan R. Bromberg
I. GENERAL AsPEcTs OF TENDER OFFERS
A. Terminology (1.100)
7'ANGUAGE IS USED LOOSELY on tender offers. In this
! article, at least, these are the meanings of the key phrases:
(1) Tender offer - a cash or exchange offer, publicly made,
by a person (usually a corporation) to acquire a large quantity of
outstanding securities of a pub-
licly held corporation.-
"Tm AuTHoR: ALAN R. BRoMmERG (2) Cash offer - a tender
(A.B., Harvard University; 1L.B. Yale offer with all cash considera-
University) is a Professor of Law at
Southern Methodist University. His tion2
teaching specialties are Corporations and (3) Exchange offer - a
Securities Regulation. He is the author tender offer with consideration
of SEcUtIEs LAW: FRAUD - SEC
RuE 1OB-5 (1967-69). consisting of securities, with or
without cash in addition.'
(4) Target company - the
company whose securities are sought in a tender offer.
(5) Target securities - the securities of the class(es) sought in
a tender offer.
I This definition, and the article, excludes offers by an issuer for its own securities.
The article generally assumes that the offeror has no prior relation with the target
company except perhaps as a noncontrolling shareholder. This is not inherent in the
definition but helps to focus the discussion.
2 The most comprehensive article on cash offers is Fleischer & Mundheim, Cor-
porate Acquisition by Tender Offer, 115 U. PA. L REV. 317 (1967), in SEm.CrBD
ARTrCLES ON FEDERAL SEcUmTEs LAW 815 (W. Wander & W. Grienenberger, eds.
1968), and 2 MERGERS & AcQUIsmONs 49 (To. 4, Summer 1967). Their article
precedes but partially anticipates the 1968 federal tender offer legislation. Act of
July 29, 1968, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), n(d)-(f) (Supp. IV, 1969) [hereinafter re-
ferred to as the Williams Bill]. Elsewhere I have written extensively on the operative
details of the Williams Bill. See A. BROMzERG, SEctUmmTins LAW: FRAUD - SEC
RuLB 10B-5 § 6.3 (1969); Bromberg, The Securities Law of Tender Offers, 15 N.YLF.
459 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Bromberg, Tender Offers], which is substantially the
same as the cited portion of the book. To avoid undue repetition here, I will refer often
to these sources.
3 For a further discussion on exchange offers, see Bromberg, Exchange Offers, 2
REV. SErC REG. 805 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Bromberg, Exchange Offers]; 12
CORP. PRAC COMMENTATOR 1 (1970).
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(6) Target management - the management of the target com-
pany.
(7) Offer price - the amount of cash offered, or the trading
market value of other consideration.
(8) Premium - the excess of the offer price over the trading
market price of the target securities. 4
(9) Trading market - all the markets in which the target
securities are customarily bought and sold (i.e., the stock exchanges
on which they are listed, and the over-the-counter and third mar-
kets in which they are traded) as distinct from the total market
which includes extraordinary transactions like the tender offer it-
self.
B. Chronology (1.200)
There are three fairly well defined phases in a tender offer: be-
fore, during and after. Throughout this article, we will have oc-
casion to distinguish among them. In a simple offer, the perti-
nent activities are described below.
1. Pre-Offer Period (1.210).- The offeror studies and evalu-
ates the target company, its securities and their holders. The of-
feror prepares the offer and the mechanics of dissemination. It
procures financing or authority to issue securities as consideration.
It complies with applicable laws and makes arrangements with
dealer-managers and others who will solicit. The offeror usually,
but not necessarily, contacts target company management and major
holders of target securities to obtain their support.
2. Offer Period (1.220).- The offer is communicated and
made effective; it may be republished or recirculated several times.
The offeror and its solicitors try to persuade holders of target se-
curities to tender. Brokers, who are commonly entitled to a double
commission by the terms of the offer, go to work on their cus-
4 The premium may be measured against the trading market price at the announce-
ment of the offer or at the beginning of the offer. These are usually simultaneous in a
cash offer but may be weeks or months apart in an exchange offer because of the need
for SEC registration. Unless otherwise indicated, I shall mean premium over the
price at the beginning of the offer.
The premium will often be about 20 percent. See Wall Street Journal, June 30,
1965, at 8, col. 4; Hayes & Taussig, Tactics of Cash Take-Over Bids, 45 HARV. BUS.
REV. 135, 139-40 (Mar.-Apr. 1967), note that some use 20 percent as a rule of thumb,
but that the median premium of 1956-66 offers was 16 percent, with a range from zero
to 44 percent. They find that premiums are proportionately larger for lower price
stocks.
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tomers who hold target securities. The dealer-managers may co-
ordinate the work of the brokers (on a best efforts basis) and the
solicitors, and also conduct any stabilization or other market opera-
tions that may be appropriate. Holders who choose to tender de-
liver their securities with prescribed transmittal forms to depositary
banks designated in the offer, or to forwarding banks.
3. Post-Offer Period (1.230).- The depositaries tally the
tenders, review their validity and determine whether any required
minimum has been attained. The offeror takes up (buys) the
tenders it is bound to by the offer, and any others it wishes to (if
permitted by the terms of the offer). The depositaries handle the
transfer of securities to the offeror, the payment of the considera-
tion and the return of tenders not taken .up.
C. Market Pattern (1.300)
The offer is inevitably reflected in the market for the target
company's securities. The typical pattern is outlined below.
1. Pre-Offer Period (1.310).- Some increase in volume and
price, perhaps from foothold purchases by the offeror, or from
purchases by others, first on the rumor that the offer will be made,
and then on the announcement (if any is made before the offer
becomes effective).
2. Offer Period (1.320).- The offer is made at a premium
above the then trading market price for the security. If the terms
of the offer have not been announced in advance (which will
typically be true in a cash offer) any stock exchange on which the
target securities are listed may halt trading long enough for some
absorption of the news. Perhaps this will be only 15 minutes.
If there is a severe imbalance of buy and sell orders, the opening
may be delayed longer. If the target securities are traded only
over-the-counter, a similar halt might be ordered by the SEC or
state authorities, although this is not common. When trading be-
gins, it is usually at considerably higher volume than before, and
the market price rises quicdy toward the offer price. The market
price should, in theory, equal the tender price discounted for (a)
the delay in payment, (b) transaction costs, and (c) the uncertainty
that the tender price will, in fact, be paid.
The buying comes largely from arbitrageurs who hope to profit
by the spread between the market price and the offer price. These
are usually brokers and other market professionals. The selling
comes largely from holders who prefer an immediate cash sale,
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at an enhanced price, to the uncertainties of the offer (if it is con-
ditional) or of the securities offered in exchange.5 If it is an
exchange offer, arbitrageurs may be simultaneously selling short
the offered securities in a hedge against decline in value of the
latter.
Tenders are ordinarily made only at the last minute before the
expiration of the offer, or before the period for pro rata takeup of
tenders.' The hope is that a better offer will come along, or that
the market price will rise above the offer price. There may also
be a fear, in an exchange, that the offered securities will decline
in value. There is, thus, a sizeable increase in the "float" of target
company securities, sensitive to small fluctuations in price. Con-
comitantly there is a tendency for securities to pass from relatively
long-term holders to short-term traders.
3. Post-Offer Period (1.330).- Volume and price of target
securities usually decline, depending in part on how many, if any,
tenders are taken up, and when this information is released.'
Market activity in the securities of the offeror is less predict-
able. The same premium that is intended to make the offer at-
tractive to securityholders of the target company may seem adverse
to holders of the offeror, in which case its securities may decline.
Or, more commonly in markets which have usually been enthusi-
astic about acquisitions, the offer terms may seem favorable to the
offeror, in which event its securities may rise. Even in this event,
the movements are unlikely to fall as neatly into periods as the tar-
get company securities. If the offer is one of exchange, when-
issued trading in the offered securities will normally begin when the
offer becomes effective. This can provide an important index of
value of the offer when it consists wholly or partly of securities
which have not previously had a market. But it can easily be dis-
torted by the conflicting play of stabilization buying and arbitrage
short selling.
D. Effects of a Tender Offer (1.400)
The initial effect of a successful tender is to reduce or elimi-
nate public ownership of the target securities, and concentrate
5 A securities firm's analysis of market strategies for, and reactions to, tender
offers (primarily cash offers) appears in BLAIR & Co., INc., THE STRATEGY OF TEN-
DER SOLICITATIONS, especially at 1-12 (1967).
6 See Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 792 (2d Cir. 1969)
(85 percent of tenders were made on last day of the contested exchange offer).'
7 For statistics, see the authorities cited note 19 infra, second paragraph.
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the ownership correspondingly in the offeror. Former security-
holders of the target company now hold cash (if it is a cash offer,
or if they have sold in the market) or securities of the offeror
(which may differ greatly in kind and quality from those previ-
ously held, as in an exchange of subordinated debentures and war-
rants of a diversified company for common stock of a one-industry
company). Thus, there is change of ownership of outstanding
securities and changes in investment of former owners. Economic
ramifications include an increase in the liquidity of investors (if
it is a cash offer) and the creation of tax liabilities in many in-
stances.
Indirect consequences are infinitely diverse. Here are some of
the more important possibilities:8
8 For a further discussion, see N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1970, at 61, cols. 6-7; id.
at 70, col. 3. The story reports an administrative hearing under Connecticut law, to
consider the exchange offer of International Telephone & Telegraph Corporation for
Hartford Fire Insurance Company. IT&T promised (1) not to cut employment in
Hartford Fire, (2) to keep Hartford Fire's headquarters in the city of Hartford, (3)
not to reduce pension and fringe benefits of Hartford Fire employees, (4) not to take
any cash out of Hartford Fire except to pay dividends, (5) not to reduce the level of
insurance in any line being written by Hartford Fire for at least 5 years, (6) not to
make investments of Hartford Fire in IT&T without permission of the State Insurance
Commissioner, and (7) not to interfere in the management of Hartford Fire, which
would have its own board of directors with IT&T members in the minority. All these
promises (most of them with time limits of 5 or 10 years) were made conditions of the
Commissioner's approval of the exchange offer. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., Conn.
Ins. Comm'r, Finding and Final Order, May 23, 1970, at 13. The order limited fund
transfers from Hartford to IT&T (item (4) above) to annual earnings, and went on to
specify that there would be no reduction in the level of Hartford's participation, finan-
cial and otherwise, in civic and charitable affairs in local cities. Finally, it provided
that IT&T, as a Hartford shareholder, would use its powers to embody the conditions
in Hartford's corporate charter.
An earlier application for a Hartford Fire merger in IT&T had been turned down
by the Insurance Commissioner, who suggested, among other things, that an exchange
offer would be fairer to minority shareholders. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.-International
Tel. & Tel. Corp., Conn. Ins. Comm'r., Finding and Final Order, Dec. 13, 1969.
Ling-Temco-Vought promised that there would be no plant closings, employment
cutbacks or pension fund "raids" at Jones & Laughlin when LTV took control after its
tender offer. On this basis, unions at J&L dropped their opposition to a settlement of
the antitrust action brought by the government, which is cited in note 143 infra. In
approving the settlement, the court specified that LTV would not direct or suggest the
investment of J&L pension funds without the consent of the Department of Justice.
Wall Street Journal, June 2, 1970, at 5, col. 2; id. June 11, 1970, at 5, col. 1 (Southwest
ed.) For another catalogue of tender offer consequences, from the antitrust viewpoint,
see United States v. Northwest Indus., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 1066, 1097-1100 (N.D. Ill.
1969) (denying preliminary injunction against exchange offer, but enjoining - pend-
ing trial on the merits - numerous specific acts of control over the target company);
United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 306 F. Supp. 766, 798-802 (D. Conn.
1969) (semble). See also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 303 F.
Supp. 1344, 1354 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (financing of cash offer by competitor of target
company).
A recent statistical study found that 57 percent of 1956-65 tender offers were
1970]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21: 613
(1) Changes of management personnel in the target company.
(2) Changes of business plans and operations in the target
company, such as purchasing, marketing, advertising and pricing.
(3) Changes in product mix or quality, or in employment
policies of the target company.
(4) Changes in asset and liability composition and utiliza-
tion of the target company, e.g., transferring assets to the offeror.
(5) Changes in corporate form of the target company, through
liquidation or merger into the parent (i.e., the offeror).
(6) Changes in capitalization and dividend policy of the tar-
get company.
(7) Changes in the market for target securities, e.g., delisting
by a stock exchange because of reduced public holdings.'
E. Contested Offers (1.500)
The picture changes drastically if the offer is contested. Market
reaction is less predictable, investor uncertainty greater. The pros-
pects for success of the offer decline sharply."0
Opposition moves are directed principally at defeat of the offer
by several major means: (a) discouraging securityholders from
tendering, (b) discouraging arbitrageurs from buying target securi-
ties in the trading markets for the purpose of tendering, and (c)
discouraging the offeror from persisting in the offer. However,
the maneuvers may have side effects or aims, such as improving
the offer or obtaining employment contracts or other perquisites
for target company management. All this is psychological as well
as economic warfare.
The wide variety of defenses and counterattacks by the target
company and its allies may include these strategies and tactics:"
(1) Fighting with words: exhortations to holders of target
followed by mergers, mostly within a few months. Austin & Fishman, The Tender
Take-Over, 4 MERGERS & AcQuisiTIoNs 4, 16-19 (No. 3, May-June 1969).
9 For allegations of antifraud violations including coercion by the threat of delist-
ing, which later occurred, see Berne St. Enterprises, Inc. v. American Export Isbrandt-
sen, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
10 Comment, Economic Realities of Cash Tender Offers, 20 ME. L REV. 237,
243-47 (1968) (survey of offers involving NYSE listed companies, January-June 1967:
only two of 10 contested offers succeeded; all eight uncontested offers succeeded).
11 On defense maneuvers generally, see Fleischer & Mundheim, supra note 2, at
321-22; Hayes & Taussig, supra note 4, at 142-47; Schmults & Kelly, Cash Take-Over
Bids - Defense Tactics, 23 Bus. LAw. 115 (1967); Comment, supra note 10, at 246,
249; Note, Defensive Tactics Employed by Incumbent Managements in Contesting
Tender Offers, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1104 (1969); 11 CoRP. PRAc. COMMENTATOR 378
(1970); Wall Street Journal, July 11, 1967, at 1, col. 6.
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securities not to tender, usually featuring arguments that the offer
price is inadequate, and that any offered securities are overvalued.
These may be preceded by a plea not to take any action pending
further study by target company management and its advisers.
Other negative publicity may be aimed at brokers and analysts able
to influence customers and clients.
(2) Trumping the offer by: (a) a better offer from an ally
(preferably tax free in the form of a merger); (b) a counter offer
by the target company; or (c) a rise in the trading market price of
target securities above the offer price induced by means such as
purchases of target securities by the target company and its allies,
raising the dividend on target securities or splitting them, making
favorable acquisitions, product or service innovations, or financial
projections (or announcing any of these if time is too short for
completion).
(3) Undermining the control potential of the offeror: issuing
additional shares to friendly hands, or calling convertible securities
or callable warrants if the common is selling high enough to as-
sure conversion or exercise.
(4) Shifting target securities into friendly hands: trading
market purchases by the target company or its allies.
(5) Impeding communication of the offer: denying the of-
feror the names and addresses of target securityholders and stalling
any court action to obtain them.
(6) Fortifying the target company: charter or bylaw amend-
ments to thwart an assumption of control by a major shareholder
(by staggering the election of directors) or a merger with it (by
increasing the necessary shareholder vote, say from two-thirds to
four-fifths).
(7) Collapsing the target company: merger into a friendly ally.
(8) Impoverishing the target company: disposing of liquid
funds, which may have attracted the offeror, by increasing divi-
dends, buying shares or purchasing other assets.
(9) Undermining the offeror: (a) court litigation to enjoin
the offer, or administrative proceedings to block it, for violation
of the securities, antitrust or other relevant laws; and (b) pres-
sures on the offeror's financing sources to deny or revoke credit.
These and other techniques are later considered in further de-
tail.12
12 Secs. (2.520)-(2.540) infra.
1970]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21: 613
F. Meaning of Success (1.600)
A successful tender offer in this article means an offer that
obtains all the target securities wanted and at the price and time
set by the offeror. The number of securities sought may be widely
varying proportions of the total outstanding, depending on the of-
feror's objectives:
(1) Working control - hinges on the existing distribution of
securities, but 20 to 30 percent suffices in many publicly held com-
panies.
(2) Assured ability to elect a majority of the board of di-
rectors1" and ability to consolidate earnings and balance sheets"' -
50 percent plus.
(3) Assured ability to merge under the laws of most states -
66 2/3 percent.
(4) Ability to file consolidated returns for tax purposes, " and
to have a tax free exchange offer' - 80 percent.
(5) Ability to use pooling of interest accounting under pro-
posed AICPA rules' 7 - 90 percent.
(6) Assured ability to merge into the offeror without share-
holder vote under the laws of some states' 8 - 90 or 95 percent.
Lesser results than those proposed by the offer do not necessarily
make the offer unsuccessful in a larger sense. Enough target se-
curities may have been obtained to give the offeror a substantial
stake in the target company. Target company management may
Is Even a majority may not be enough if the directors are dassified or staggered.
If they are not, and there is no cumulative voting or other classes of voting securities,
a majority of the shares elects the whole board.
14SEC Reg. S-X, Rule 4-02(a), 17 C.F.R. § 210.4-02(a) (1969), reprinted in 4
CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 69,202, at 61,131. Minority interests must be separately ac-
counted for. Rule 4-07, 17 C.F.R. § 210.4-07 (1969), reprinted in 4 CCH FED. SEc.
L REP. 5 69,207, at 61,132.
15 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1501, 1504(a) [hereinafter cited as CODE]. There
must be 80 percent ownership of any nonvoting stock too.
16 Id. § 368(a)(1)(B). See generally B. BITTKmR & J. EusTncE, FEDERAL INcomE
TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS § 12.13 (2d ed. 1966).
17 AICPA, Proposed APB Opinion: Business Combinations and Intangible Assets
5 46b (Exposure Draft Feb. 23, 1970), discussed in [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEc.
L REP. 5 77-784, at 83,805. The consideration must be voting common stock, and
many other conditions must be met. If there is a clear minimum for pooling in present
accounting rules I am unable to find it. AICPA Accounting Research Bull. No. 48, 5
4 (Jan. 1957), in 2 CCH ACCOUNTING PRINcIPLES 6081, requires a combination of
"substantially all the ownership interests" of two companies for pooling. One account-
ing author says that this means 90-95 percent in practice. G. MCCARTHY, ACQUISI-
TIONS AND MERGERS 119 (1963).
18 E.g., ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 68A (1967) (95 percent); DEL CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 253, (1953), as amended, (Supp. 1968), (90 percent).
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have been stimulated to greater efficiency or imagination. Market
prices of target securities may have reached a higher plateau, with
benefits for all holders."9
G. Alternative Techniques (1.700)
The tender offer is initially an acquisition of securities. These
are usually voting securities which may also lead to working control
of the target company through election of directors. Finally, the
tender may produce a combination of the businesses of the offeror
and the target company either in the formal legal sense (say, of
merger) or in the economic sense. In each of these three aspects,
there are alternatives to the tender offer.
1. Securities Acquisition (1.710).- As a method of obtaining
ownership of target company securities, the tender offer is an alter-
native to purchase in the trading market, private purchase of out-
standing securities, and direct purchase from the target company.
The tender offer may be more or less effective in volume, speed
and cost, depending on such factors as the kind of tender offer
(cash, which is faster, or exchange), the nature of the trading
market in target securities, the distribution of target company se-
curities, and the disposition of the target company.
2. Control Acquisition (1.720).- As a method of acquiring
control of the target company, the tender offer is an alternative to
the other means of acquiring ownership, mentioned above, and to
the proxy fight. The tender offer (at least for cash) is generally
considered surer, cheaper and quicker than the proxy fight.20
3. Business Combination (1.730).- As a method of busi-
ness combination, the tender offer is an alternative to merger
and purchase-sale of assets. It does not result in complete fusion
of the offeror and the target company, for the latter continues to
exist as a subsidiary, rarely wholly owned. For this reason, a tender
19 See BLAM & Co., INC, supra note 5, at 12-13, advising prospective offerors to
have a range of such goals in mind.
Some offerors have garnered large profits on resale of target securities. See Wall
Street Journal, Jan. 27, 1969, at 1, col. 6; Comment, supra note 10, at 243, 246,
noting also that even unsuccessful cash offers (in the 1967 period studied) produced a
"permanently" higher price level for target securities than before the offer. For a list of
figures, see id. at 248. But researchers of 1956-66 cash offers found that target se-
curities lagged relative to comparable securities not involved in tender offers, more
so if the offer failed. Hayes & Taussig, supra note 4, at 147, exhibit VII.
20 Austin & Fishman, supra note 8, at 14-15 (tabulating 1956-67 results); Hayes
& Taussig, supra note 4, at 137; Swanson, S. 510 and the Regulaion of Cash Tender
Offers: Distinguishing St. George from the Dragon, 5 HARV. J. LEGIs. 431, 436-37
(1968); Comment, supra note 10, at 239-40.
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offer is often a prelude to a merger or asset transaction. At the
initial stage it has the marked advantage to the offeror that it
does not require corporate action by the target company, and can
bypass a potentially hostile management in that company. Even if
target management is cordial, the combination may take the form of
a tender offer because the offeror prefers the lesser investment
which results in a partially owned subsidiary. By preserving the tar-
get company's corporate entity, the tender offer may succeed where
the other types of fusion fail, e.g., if there are nontransferable
rights in the target company, or restrictions on merger or asset
sales in loan agreements or indentures. 21  A cash offer is usually
faster than a merger or asset deal; an exchange offer may take more
or less time. A tender offer ordinarily does not require any share-
holder approval in the offeror company,22 or create appraisal rights
in shareholders of either company. In contrast, an asset sale usually
creates voting and appraisal rights for shareholders of the selling
company, and a merger does these things in both companies. But
a tender offer does not eliminate minority interests; if that is de-
sired, another step (e.g., merger) is necessary.
Often a merger or asset transaction can be made at a lower pre-
mium per share than a tender offer, particularly if the offer is tax-
able while the alternative is not.
Another significant advantage of the tender offer is that it
facilitates acquisition of a bank, insurance company or other regu-
lated business which could not be merged with the offeror in an-
other industry, and whose assets could not be bought directly.
Triangular mergers will do the job, but few states yet authorize
them.23
The antitrust laws, by my minimal understanding of them, treat
tender offers like mergers and other forms of business combina-
tion.
Within the class of tender offers, there are important differences
21 Similar restrictions on tender offers are now written into some agreements. See
Note, Defensive Tactics Employed by Incumbent Managements in Contesting Tender
Offers, supra note 11, at 1109.
22 For exceptions, see text accompanying note 77-78 infra.
23 See DEL. CODE ANN. § 251 (b) (4) (1953), as amended, (Supp. 1968), permit-
ting X corporation to merge into Y corporation upon issuance of securities of Z corp-
oration (the parent of Y). Under most statutes, the only securities issuable in a mer-
ger are those of Y, the surviving corporation. See, e.g., ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP.
Acr § 65(c) (1967). Acquisition through a subsidiary can be accomplished in most
states with parent securities by transferring the parent securities to the subsidiary, and
the subsidiary using them as consideration for an asset purchase from the other com-
pany. But this is not technically a merger except under statutes like Delaware's.
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between cash and exchange offers. The former are always taxable,
the latter sometimes are not.2 An exchange offer requires no cur-
rent funds, paying rather by commitment of future funds through
issuance of debt securities, or by issuance of equity securities with
a corresponding possibility of dilution. Target securityholders
get a less certain value in an exchange offer than in a cash of-
fer, but it is not always possible to predict which they will find
more appealing.
II. COMPETING INTERESTS: SAFEGUARDS AND RESTRAINTS
A. Introduction (2.000)
1. Kinds of Interests (2.010).- A number of disparate inter-
ests in a tender offer can be identified. We consider them sepa-
rately at the points indicated, under the following categories:
a. Offeror (2.100)
b. Offeror Management (2.200)
c. Offeror Securityholders (2.300)
d. Offeror Constituents (2.400)
e. Target Company (2.500)
f. Target Company Management (2.600)
g. Target Securityholders (2.700)
h. Other Target Company Securityholders (2.800)
i. Target Company Constituents (2.900)
j. Third Persons and the Market (2.1000)
The interests are primarily economic, but they include many
other possibilities, ranging from psychological to patriotic.
2. Kinds of Safeguards (2.020).- The several interests are
protected in a number of ways:
(1) Self-help by the parties, including economic actions and
transactions.
(2) Statutory requirements and fiduciary principles of state
corporate law.
(3) General antifraud provisions of federal and state securi-
ties law.
(4) Registration, disclosure and special antifraud provisions of
federal and state securities law in an exchange offer.
(5) Tender offer disclosure and antifraud provisions of the
24See CODE § 368(a)(1)(B). See generally B. BITrKER & J. EUSrCc, supra note
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1968 amendments to federal securities law, i.e., the Williams Bill,25
in a cash offer.
(6) Proxy disclosure and antifraud provisions of federal law
(and possibly state law) if proxies are solicited from target security-
holders with their tenders, or for a defensive merger, or from se-
curityholders of the offeror for their authorization of the offer.
(7) Qualitative requirements of the terms of some offers cov-
ered by the Williams Bill.
Rather than write about these seven categories, I will review
the interests of the various parties, and consider how each of them
can use the relevant categories, or are limited by them.
3. Kinds of Restraints (2.030).- To a large extent the re-
straints on one interest group come from the safeguards for another
group. To the extent they are legal safeguards, they may be en-
forced by legal restraints, such as court decrees or administrative
orders. Short of this, they are usually observed out of respect for
the law or in deference to the legal restraints available. In addi-
tion, there are economic, market and tax restraints of varying force.
These restraints and a few others are examined in the following
discussion, under the groups to which they apply.
4. Problems in Evaluation (2.040).- To list the interests,
restraints and safeguards is to reveal an intricate set of checks and
balances. But this is not enough to quantify or evaluate them.
Even in the abstract, this can be done only crudely, if at all. In a
concrete case, it may be even harder, for example, to weigh the in-
terests of employees of one company against those of security-
holders in another company. All too often this is comparing apples
and oranges, and tastes differ. To complicate the task further, there
is a shifting membership of some of the classes. For example, the
high volume of trading in target securities during the Offer Period
means a considerable change in the persons who own these securi-
ties. Are the interests of a 5-year holder of target securities the
same as those of one who bought 5 minutes after the start of the
offer? Are they entitled to equal safeguards? There is no ready
answer.
Nonetheless, I will hazard a judgment on the adequacy and
propriety of the safeguards and restraints for each group.
B. Offeror (2.100)
1. Interests (2.110).- The offeror has the greatest direct, eco-
215 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), n(d)-(f) (Supp. IV, 1969).
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nomic interest in the offer. In addition to the considerationit may
have to pay (in cash or securities), it has incurred substantial costs
in preparing for the offer, such as commitment fees of financing a
cash offer, costs of SEC registration of an exchange offer (mainly
legal, accounting and printing expenses), charges of dealer-managers
and solicitors, not to mention the costs of investigation and evalua-
tion of the target company. It has a less direct economic stake in
the opportunity for growth, diversification and profit that moti-
vated the offer in the first place. The trading market's reaction to
the offer will affect the value of its securities in the short run and
perhaps in the long run.
The offeror's main concerns, then, are to effectuate the offer and
its related plans for the target company, and to protect itself from
loss if the offer fails.
The offeror may have other capacities which give it, if not
other interests, at least other leverage to press its interests as offeror.
For example, it will commonly be a stockholder of the target com-
pany by the time the offer starts. Thus it will have standing to
enforce fiduciary obligations of target company management.20
2. Safeguards and Restraints in Making the Offer (2.120).
a. Contract (2.121).- The offeror enjoys freedom of con-
tract in setting the terms of the offer, within some fairly severe
limits noted below. The offer can vary in many important ways:
(1) It may be for one or more classes of target securities.27
(2) It may be for any specified proportion of a class of target
company securities.28
(3) It may be contingent on a minimum number of acceptances
or tenders.
(4) It may reserve the right to take more or less.'
(5) The consideration offered may be cash or securities, and
26 See, e.g., Northwest Indus., Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706 (E.D,
I1M. 1969), finding, however, no probability that the plaintiff could prove breach of
duty. The offeror was apparently suing derivatively as a target company shareholder
in Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 43 Del. Ch. 353, 230 A.2d 769 (Ch. 1967)
(target company issuance of additional shares cancelled).
27 Normally the offer will be for the class with greatest voting control, e.g., com-
mon stock, but may also be for securities convertible into common stock, or for war-
rants to purchase common stock. If the significant voting power is in some other
security, this will commonly be sought. For an example, see Allied Artists Pictures
Corp. v. D. Kaltman & Co., 283 F. Supp. 763, 764 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (tender offer
for preferred shares which, because of dividend arrearages, had power to elect majority
of directors). Debt securities, otherwise without voting power, may have rights to
vote on a bankruptcy reorganization plan, which would make them possible objects of
a tender offer.
2 For some of the relevant factors, see sec. (1.600) supra.
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the latter may include various classes of shares, debt or warrants.
If the consideration is cash, there must be an adequate source of
funds;29 which must be disclosedY0 If the consideration is securi-
ties, they must ordinarily be registered under the Securities Act of
1933"' and under any applicable state securities law.
Lesser, but still significant, variables include:
(6) The duration of the offer, and any right to extend it.
(7) The mechanics of tendering."2
(8) Withdrawal rights prior to the offeror's final takeup of
acceptances (i.e., revocability of tenders).
(9) Whether acceptances will be taken up first-come-first-
served, or pro rata or otherwise, and whether the arrangements
will be the same throughout the offer.
(10) Conditions on the taking up of tenders, such as no ma-
terial adverse change (as determined by the offeror) in the finan-
cial condition of the offeror or of the target company.
(11) Price adjustments for any extraordinary distributions
by the target company.
(12) When payment is to be made.
(13) Whether proxies on tendered shares are solicited, and,
if so, on what terms.
(14) Commissions to be paid brokers for obtaining accept-
ances.
b. .Market (2.122).- The offeror enjoys freedom of the
market in fixing the terms of the offer, particularly how many se-
29 SEC v. Fenster, SEC Litigation Release Nos. 3728 (May 25, 1967), 3741 (June
2, 1967) (S.D. Cal. 1967), discussed in Wall Street Journal, May 25, 1967, at 3, col.
2, and in id. May 26, 1967, at 5, col. 2; SEC v. Zweifach, SEC Litigation Release Nos.
3858 (Nov. 16, 1967), 3875 (Dec. 1, 1967) (S.D.N.Y. 1967). The SEC obtained in-
junctions against insufficiently funded offerors, invoking the antifraud provisions.
On the effect of the margin rules, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 7, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78g (Supp. IV, 1969) [hereinafter cited as Exchange Act], see Comment, Applica-
tion of Margin Requirements to the Cash Tender Offer, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 103 (1967).
S0 See sec. (2.721) infra.
31 Securities Act of 1933, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1964) [hereinafter cited as Securi-
ties Act]. By hypothesis, the target company is publicly held, so that the private offer-
ing exemption is inapplicable. Id. § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1964). If all the
target securityholders were in a single state where the offeror was incorporated and doing
business, the intrastate exemption might be available. Id. § 3(a) (11), 15 U.S.C. §
77c(a) (11) (1964). If the offeror is a bank or common carrier, its securities may be
exempt. Id. §§ 3(a) (2), (6), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c(a) (2), (6) (1964). Other, less im-
portant, exemptions in sections 2 and 3 might be applicable. Id. §§ 2, 3, 15 U.S.C. §§
77b, c (1964).
S2 See Walston & Co., Inc. v. Haven Indus., Inc., [1967-69 Transfer Binder] CCH
FBD. SEC. L REP. 9 92,364, at 97,721 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 1969) (telegraphic tender
not received before expiration as required by exchange offer).
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curities it wants33 and at what price, and how much it will pay
brokers to procure them. At the same time, it subjects itself to the
constraints of the market. The offer price should be high enough
to attract the desired tenders. It should be low enough to avoid a
dilution of earnings per share for the offeror and a drop in the
market price of its securities. The magic range can never be fore-
told with complete accuracy. In an exchange offer, the constraints
are even more complex, both because the offer price itself will fluc-
tuate in the trading market, and because the investor appeal of one
or more securities is less predictable than the appeal of cash. The
offeror commonly has the advice of dealer-managers and analysts
in fixing the terms of the offer. 4
c. Securities and Corporate Law (2.123).- The offeror is
subject to some legal restraints in making an offer. If it is an out-
sider, there are antifraud and disclosure requirements under federal
securities laws." If it is an insider, such as a controlling share-
holder of the target company, there is an additional obligation of
fairness, especially as to price.36 Even an outsider may be an in-
sider in the sense developed in Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence if the of-
feror has received material information about the target company
in the course of negotiations with it. In such a case, the offeror
would violate Rule 10b-5 by buying securities pursuant to the offer
(or in the trading market) before the information had been dis-
dosed and absorbed.37
The offeror also has freedom to improve the offer by increas-
ing the consideration, subject to the further constraint that the
8 For some of the variables in choosing the desired number of target securities, see
sec (1.600) supra.
84 Kelly, Some Observations on Contested Take-Over Bids, 15 N.Y.LF. 619, 628-29
(1969), says that the dealer-manager in an exchange offer, who serves as a sort of under-
writer, does not ordinarily perform the investor-protecting function of an underwriter
in a cash offer. He arrives later on the scene and is not in a position to insist upon pro-
tective provisions in debentures, shares, or warrants being offered. He almost never
has a firm commitment to dispose of the offered securities. On the other hand, he is
equally an underwriter for purposes of Securities Act liabilities, e.g., under section 11.
Securities Act § 11 15 U.S.C. § 77K (1964); see id. § 2(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11)
(1964) (definition of underwriter). The dealer-manager or other financial adviser
to the offeror normally does not purport to be an independent expert, as he may be in
recommending the terms of a merger, or in a transaction involving a conflict of interest.
35 See secs. (2.525), (2.721) infra.
36 Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 843 (D. Del. 1951); Epstein v.
Celotex Corp., 43 Del Ch. 504,238 A.2d 843 (Ch. 1968).
3 7 See A. BROMBERG, supra note 2, at § 7.4.
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higher consideration must be paid to all persons who have previ-
ously tendered pursuant to the same offer. 8
The duration of the offer, the right to withdraw tenders, and
the taking up of acceptances are limited by federal law."'
The offeror apparently has freedom of the market to accumulate
target company shares before the offer is made known.40 Trans-
actions within 60 days of the offer must be disclosed in the offer.4
The offeror's freedom to use the trading market to buy target
securities outside the tender offer was curtailed in 1969 when the
SEC promulgated Rule lob-13 4 2 to prohibit this practice after the
first public announcement of the offer.
The offeror enjoys freedom of timing the offer in varying mea-
sures. In a cash offer, it has virtually complete control over when
it will make the offer. In an exchange offer which has to be regis-
tered, it must wait for SEC and state clearance. In either case,
there will normally be restraints on how briefly it can keep the
offer open.43
d. Tax Law (2.124).- The federal income tax law im-
poses some restraints on the offeror directly, and indirectly through
its impact on target securityholders. The primary effects are on
the kinds and amount of consideration offered. In order to have a
tax-free transaction for target securityholders, only voting stock
may be offered.44  This can be (and often is) a voting preferred
with higher dividend and lower vote (relative to value) than the
offeror's common. A nontaxable exchange requires that the offeror
have 80 percent of the common stock of the target company after
the offer (some of which it may have acquired previously). The
offeror has these alternatives:
(a) Seeking 80 percent and using voting stock, usually with
38 See sec. (2.724) infra.
SO See sec. (2.723) infra.
4 0 See General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 403 F.2d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969) (no violation in open market purchases and a spe-
cial bid in anticipation of a merger offer by the buyer); A. BRoMBERG, supra note 2, §
6.3(835) n.41.1; Bromberg, Tender Offers, supra note 2, at 542 n.442. If the buyer is
an insider of the target company, the situation may be quite different.
If the offeror uses investment companies as allies to help accummulate target com-
pany shares, a whole new series of problems arise. See Thomas, Warehousing, 3 REV.
SEC. REG. 975 (1970).
41 See secs. (2.721)(6), (8) infra.
42 SEC Exchange Act Rule lOb-13, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-13 (1969), reprinted in 2
CCH FED. SEc. L REP. 5 26,752, at 20,071-4.
43 See sec. (2.723) infra.
4 4 CODE § 368(a)(1)(B). See generally B. BITrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 16.
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no certainty that it will get 80 percent (especially in a contested
offer), with corresponding uncertainty for target securityholders
about their tax results and a probable damper on their tendering.
This alternative may require a higher price per share than would at-
tract a smaller percentage of target securities, and it abandons the
leverage of working control that may be possible by acquiring a
small majority or a minority of the target securities.
(b) Seeking less than 80 percent, or using cash, debt, warrants
or nonvoting stock, with a taxable exchange, lower appeal to target
securityholders, and the need to set a price high enough that the
after-tax residue will still be attractive for target securityholders. 45
The possibility of a tax-deferred exchange of readily marketable
debt securities, using the installment sale provisions, was ended
by the Tax Reform Act of 1969.46
A different part of the 1969 tax law imposes other constraints
on an exchange offer which includes debt securities. In general
terms, interest payments above $5 million a year are not deductible
for subordinated, convertible (or warrant-accompanied) debt is-,
sued to acquire the stock of the target company if the offeror ends
up with a debt-equity ratio higher than 2:1 (or if its projected
earnings cover all interest requirements less than three times) .4
This law affects the type of debt security offered, the size of the
offering and thereby the proportion of target securities sought.48
The overall effect is to discourage exchange offers of debt securities.
The 1969 tax provisions were designed to raise revenue and to
discourage conglomerate takeovers by tender offers or other means.
They are sure to have a deterrent effect on tender offers.
45 The tax rates for holders of target securities will vary considerably, depending
on (1) whether they hold target securities as capital assets or (like many broker-dealers)
as stock in trade or for sale to customers [CODE § 12211; (2) whether they have held
more than 6 months in order to qualify for long-term capital gain treatment if the se-
curities are capital assets [id. §§ 1222(3), (7)); (3) the level of their other ordinary in-
come which may make the deduction for capital gain lid. § 1202] more favorable in
their rate brackets than the alternative tax [id. § 1201); and (4) the level of their other
capital gains, and whether or not they are corporations, for determining the rate of the al-
ternative tax [id. §§ 1201 (a)-(c)], and of the minimum tax on preferences [id. §§ 56,
57(a)(9)]. Many of these variables were introduced by the Tax Reform Act of 1969
[83 Star. 487], which made the pricing of a tender offer considerably more intricate.
There is a tendency to set a price which will be more attractive to the larger holders,
who are likely to be in higher tax brackets. Holders in lower brackets, usually the
smaller ones, get a bit of a windfall.
46 CODE § 453 (b) (3).
47id. § 279.
48 With current interest rates on convertible debt around 7 percent, the $5 million
limit means that companies will rarely want to bring their total outstanding acquisition
debt (including debt issued in exchange offers) above some $70 million.
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e. Other (2.125).- If the target company management
opposes the offer, or is expected to do so, there is another serious
restraint on the offeror: lack of access to internal records and infor-
mation of the target company. Without them, the offeror has a
much weaker basis for pricing the offer (or even for deciding
whether to offer at all) and for making plans for the target com-
pany if the offer succeeds.49 A byproduct is the absence of the de-
tailed warranties and representations which invariably are made in
negotiated mergers and asset acquisitions.
3. Safeguards and Restraints in Communications (2.130)
The success of the offer depends heavily on the offeror's ability
to communicate with the offerees. There are several restraints on
this freedom. In a cash offer, certain information has to be filed
with the SEC and included in the offer."0 On the whole, this is a
mild restraint unless the disclosures are embarrassing. But one of
the disclosures - the required statement of purposes and plans for
the target company - will often be troublesome and litigation
breeding because of the probable contingencies in plans at the be-
ginning of the Offer Period.5' This is especially true in a contested
offer, where the matter is most likely to go to court. In an ex-
change offer, which typically has to be registered with the SEC
under the 1933 Act,52 there is a prohibition on conditioning pub-
licity before the registration statement is filed, a ban on favorable
projections and predictions throughout the offer, a requirement
that all written offers (other than tombstone ads) be by pro-
spectus, and a general muffling of salesmanship. 8 This can create
4 9 See Kelly, supra note 34, at 623-26.50 See note 172 infra.
5 1 See Pan American Sulphur Co. v. Susequehanna Corp., [Current Binder] CCH
FED. SEc. L. RET,. 5 92,473, at 98,233 (W.D. Tex. May 28, 1969), rev'd, [Current
Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 92,610, at 98,749 (5th Cir. Mar. 13, 1970); In re
Susquehanna Corp., [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ! 77,741, at 83,692 (SEC
Hearing Examiner Aug. 5, 1969), both involving the adequacy of disclosure of inten-
tions to use the target company as a vehicle for further acquisitions. For further discus-
sion, see A. BROMBERG, supra note 2, §§ 6.3(450)-(468); Bromberg, Tender Offers,
supra note 2, at 493-503.
52 Securities Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1964).
53 Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp., [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L REP. 5 92,510, at 98,372 (2d Cir. Nov. 6, 1969) (violation of section 5 [Securities
Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1964)] in announcing that an exchange offer would
be made with a value of $80 per target company share, in opinion of named invest-
ment banker). Accord, SEC v. Bangor Punta Corp., [1967-69 Transfer Binder]
CCH Fm. SEc. L REP. g 92,428, at 98,021 (D.D.C. May 26, 1969). See generally
Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades & Co., 38 S.E.C. 843 (1959); SEC Securities Act Release No.
3844, in 1 CCH FED. SEc L. REP. 55 3250-56, at 3108-13; 1 L. Loss, SECUsrns
REGULATION 215-21 (2d ed. 1961); 4 id. 2318-20 (Supp. 1969); SEC, REPORT ON
DISCLosURE TO OPvsTots - A REAPPRAisAL oF FEDERAL ADMiNiSTRATIVE
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a serious imbalance in a contested offer, for the opponents are not
similarly restricted in their statements.
The offeror normally has several means to disseminate the
offer widely and follow up on it: direct mail to holders, news-
paper (and perhaps magazine) advertising, releases to the finan-
cial press, and brokers.
Direct mail will usually reach a larger proportion of target se-
curityholders than any other method. But it does not directly
touch beneficial owners of securities in street name, or even indi-
rectly holders of bearer securities. Moreover, it is expensive, espe-
cially with a fat prospectus for an exchange offer. And it may be
impossible if uncooperative target management denies access to the
securityholders list. The offeror can, as a shareholder of the target'
company, eventually get the list by suing under state law," but it
is perhaps too late to do much good.
Newspaper and similar advertisements can inform many target
securityholders if the publications are well chosen and not too costly.
But effective placement of the ads requires some knowledge of
the distribution of target securities. There may be local concentra-
tions of ownership not reached by the Wall Street Journal or the
New York Times. Nor is it clear how effective the ads are in
telling securityholders or in eliciting response. They probably, do
a better job in a cash offer. A dollar price is instantly meaningful.
And the ad can include the entire offer and transmittal letter, so
that the persuaded holder can act at once. An exchange offer ad
might consist of the entire SEC prospectus plus a transmittal letter,
but this would be unthinkably costly. Rather, the published ver-
sion is in practice limited to the tombstone ad which says little more
than that X Co. is offering securities in a stated ratio to the holders
of Y securities for a certain period, but that the offering is made
only by prospectus, obtainable from named sources. The investor
may be put off. Even if he wants to act, it will take him minutes
or days, depending on where he is, to get the transmittal letter and
prospectus.
Press releases will go out on the wire services to many brokers,
analysts and institutional investors, some of whom may be (or have
influence with) large holders of target securities. Releases will also
produce some informative news stories about the offer in the daily
PoLiIs UNDER THE '33 AND '34 AcTs 16-18, 127-48 (CCI ed. 1969) [referred to as
WHEAT REPORT).
5 4 ite Corp. v. Heli-Coil Corp., 256 A.2d 855 (Del. Ch. 1969). See E.L Bruce
Co. v. Delaware, 51 Del. 252, 144 A.2d 533 (1958).
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or weekly press, most likely in those publications carrying ads for
the offer.
Very often the brokers are crucial communication links. They
may hold target securities in street name for their customers, in
which case they are obliged to forward the offer if the offeror pays
the expense.55 These are holders the offeror could not contact
directly with a securityholders list, since they do not appear on it.
Even with the broker's obligation to forward the offer, much de-
pends on his promptness in doing so. In addition, brokers will
often call other customers whom they know to be holders of target
securities. Moreover, the brokers tend to recommend acceptance of
the offer, because of the attractive commissions they hope to collect
from the offeror. The brokers may be influential with large insti-
tutional holders of target securities, who are often critical to the
success of an offer. Finally, the brokers may themselves become
arbitrageurs in support of the offer, or induce customers to assume
this role.
To the extent possible, these channels will be used to recircu-
late the offer and solicit acceptances. In addition, personal solici-
tation will be employed for big holders of target securities who can
be identified.
4. Safeguards Against Defeat of the Offer (2.140).- The
offeror's main assurance against defeat is in making the market
value of the offer attractive, as discussed above. 6
The offeror is not protected against opposition, or against
competitive buying of target securities. 57  It is protected against
fraudulent or deceptive opposition by section 14(e) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and to some degree by Rule lob-5, and
should have corresponding standing to sue for violations.58 There
55 N.Y. Stock Exch. Rule 465, in 2 CCH N.Y.S.E. GUIDE, 5 2465 (1964). Amer-
ican Stock Exch. Rule 585, in 2 CCH A.S.E. GUIDE 5 9537 (1968); Midwest Stock
Exchange, Art. XXX, Rule 7, in CCH M.S.E. GUIDE 5 2597 (1968). Quite apart from
the rules applicable to members of these exchanges, there is probably a broader fiduciary
obligation of a broker to notify his customer of such an offer if not actually to forward
it.
56 Sec. (2.122) supra.
5 7 See National Union Elec. Corp. v. National Presto Indus., Inc., [Current Binder]
CCII FED. SErc. L. REP. S 92,460, at 98,178 (W.D. Wis. July 8, 1969) (refusing a
temporary restraining order against target company purchases of its own securities).
The target company must file and disseminate certain information before it can buy
its own shares. See SEC Exchange Act Rule 13e-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-1 (1969), re-
printed in 2 CCII FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 26,852, at 20,107-3.
58 Exchange Act § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (Supp. IV, 1969), expressly applies
antifraud provisions to "any solicitation in opposition to or in favor of any" tender offer.
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remains the difficulty of fashioning suitable relief after a violation
has occurred in a typically brief, bitter contest. The Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit has recently indicated that the only
limit is equity to all parties concerned. 9
Just what amounts to fraud or deception in a tender offer is
not fully developed. But it includes any misrepresentation of in-
formation likely to be material to a target securityholder in mak-
ing his decision whether to tender,60 any nondisclosure of similar
import, 1 and deceptive market transactions.6 2
The SEC has powers, largely unused, to seek an injunction
against a violation such as manipulation,"- or to suspend trading
The duties seem to be symmetrical for proponents and opponents, and symmetrical
standing to sue should follow.
The case is less clear under SEC Exchange Act Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(1969). Many courts confine standing to buyers or sellers of securities. A trend of
relaxation has been evident. See A. BROMBERG, supra note 2, § 8.8. But the Second
Circuit has recently restated the Rule 10b-5 standing limitation to bar a cash tender
offeror from suing. Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp. 417 F.2d 963, 969-70
(2d Cir. 1969) (indicating, however, that there would be standing under section 14(e) ).
A month later another panel of the same court accorded Rule 10b-5 standing to an
exchange offeror who was a "forced seller" of target securities through this chain of
events: (1) failure of the offer, caused by violations by the target company and its pro-
posed merger partner; (2) target company merger with a competitor of the offeror;
(3) threat of antitrust litigation against the offeror if it retained its holdings in the
merged company; and (4) sale of offeror's holdings in the merged company. Crane Co.
v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969). Dictum also indicated
that the offeror had standing under section 14(e). Id. at 798-99. The distinction be-
tween a cash offer and an exchange offer has no functional significance here. Apart
from divergent views of the judges, the difference in result seems to lie in the "forced
seller" fortuity. And in Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v Bangor Punta Corp., [Current Binder]
CCH FED. SEc. L REP. 5 92,510, at 98,372 (2d Cir. Nov. 6, 1969), an offeror was
allowed to sue, primarily for violation of the Securities Act, without any discussion of
its standing.
59 Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 803-04 (2d Cir. 1969)
(remedy may include damages, injunction, divestiture, or separation of target com-
pany's merger into an ally). For further discussion of remedies, see cases cited notes
121, 141 infra, A. BROMBERG, supra note 2, §§ 6.3(1100)-(1130); Bromberg, Tender
Offers, supra note 2, at 555-66.
6 0 Butler Aviation Int'l, Inc. v. Comprehensive Designers, Inc., [Current Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L REP. S 92,557, at 98,541 (2d Cir. Jan. 8, 1970) (misrepresentation
of exchange offeror's past and predicted earnings).
61 Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 795-96 (2d Cir. 1969)
(nondisclosure of market manipulation by target company ally was a separate violation).
See also Symington Wayne Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 383 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1969)
(finding, however, that the nondisdosures by the offeror were not material).
62 Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969). "The
manipulation may be found to have deprived [the offeror] of success in its tender of-
fer in the free market to which it was entitled." Id. at 803-04.
63 For examples of SEC injunctions in tender offers, see authorities cited note 29
sUpra
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in any security involved if it concludes that public interest and
investor protection so require.64
If the target company solicits proxies, as for a defensive mer-
ger, the disclosure and antifraud provisions of the proxy rules of-
fer some protection to the offeror, who probably has standing to
sue.65 At the same time, the offeror's pursuit of the offer may be
regarded as solicitation of proxies against the merger, requiring it
to comply with proxy rules.6 8
5. Critique (2.150).- The offeror is, on the whole, suitably
safeguarded by its initiative and freedom of action in the market.
There is only one serious gap in the protections afforded the of-
feror. This is the lack of assurance of communication with target
securityholders. State corporate law inspection rights may fill the
gap, but there is much to be said for a federal securities law pro-
vision to this effect. An analogy exists in the proxy rules, which
require a company to elect either to furnish a list or to mail the op-
position's solicitation.67 A still stronger argument for this sort of
requirement can be made in behalf of target securityholders.68
A second problem is a heavy restraint on what an exchange of-
feror can say, while the opposition, if any, is constrained only by
the fraud provisions. The offeror cannot talk about value or
make projections, but the other side can. There are two ways to re-
64 Exchange Act § 15(c)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(5) (Supp. IV, 1969); id. § 19(a)( 4 ),
15 U.S.C. § 78s(a)(4) (1964). See generally Goldman & Magrino, Suspension of Trad-
ing in Securities: Some Observations on Section 15(c)(5) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 N.Y.L.F. 633 (1969); Comment, Summary and Successive Suspension
of Trading under the Exchange Act of 1934: The Constitution, the Congress and the
SEC, 18 CATH U.L REv. 57 (1968); 1 SECURITIS L REv. 578 (1969).
I am aware of only one SEC suspension in the context of a tender offer. The Com-
mission suspended trading in J. J. Newberry Co. when an offer for its shares was
published by someone apparently unable to pay. The suspension was lifted a day later
after the SEC had filed an injunction complaint against the offeror, alleging antifraud
violations, and had publicized the contents of the complaint. SEC News Digest,
May 25, 1967, at 1; id. May 26, 1967, at 1. For the litigation side of the action, see
SEC v. Fenster, SEC Litigation Release Nos. 3728 (May 25, 1967), 3741 (June 2,
1967) (S.D. Cal. 1967). For other SEC powers, see authorities cited note 179 infra.
65 See Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cit. 1969)
(finding, however, no proxy violation). On the applicability of the proxy rules, see
note 80 infra & accompanying text.
66 See Brown v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 328 F.2d 122 (7th Cir. 1964) (holding,
however, that the advertisements in question were not solicitations); cf. Union Pac.
R.R. v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 226 F. Supp. 400 (N.D. III. 1964) (broker's report evalu-
ating merger and exchange offer was solicitation; resolicitation required).
67 SEC Exchange Act Rule 14a-7, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-7 (1969), reprinted in 2
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 26,861, at 20,116. The proxy provision does not guarantee
disclosure of the size of holdings, and thus permits no concentrated salesmanship. 2
L Loss, supra note 53, at 892. Is something more needed in a tender offer?
68See sec. (2.790) infra.
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store balance: liberalize the rules for the offeror, or tighten them
for the target company. The SEC favored the latter method at the
time of the Williams Bill. 69  Senator Williams introduced a bill
in 1970 that would have this effect.70 My judgment is that a
better balance for all concerned would be to let the offeror say
more, subject always to the antifraud rules.71  The other restraints
of registration - cost, delay, SEC review - are fully justified, but
the limitations on the offeror's solicitations are less so.
C. Offeror Management (2.200)
1. Interests (2.210).- The management of the offeror has
interests which are likely to be very closely aligned with those of
the offeror itself. There may additionally be ego factors that
make the leaders more eager to control the target company, or
to enjoy notoriety from the offer, than the economics justify. De-
feat of the offer may cause psychic wounds to their reputations as
managers, so they may be more aggressive than the situation war-
rants. They are likely to see themselves, especially in a con-
tested offer, as bold and efficient deployers of resources, and the
target company and its management as timid and inefficient.
2. Safeguards (2.220).- The offeror's management' is not
separately accorded any protections but shelters under the same
ones granted the offeror.
3. Restraints (2.230).- The restraints on the management of
the offeror are largely the same as those on the offeror, plus their
duties of care and loyalty to the corporation. 2
4. Critique (2.240).- Management of the offeror is ade-
quately protected by the safeguards for the offeror. The restraints
seem suitable within the very broad discretion allowed management
in the contemporary business and legal environment. Perhaps a
little more restraint - in the form of securityholder approval -
is needed on tender offers which involve a disproportionate alloca-
69 Hearings on S. 510, Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Sen. Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 28-29,38,41,201 (1967).
70 S. 3431, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (1970). The proposal would eliminate the ex-
emption of registered exchange offerings from the 1968 Williams Bill and thus bring
them under the SEC's power to regulate opposition solicitations pursuant to section
14(d)(4) of the Exchange Act. Exchange Act § 14(d)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(4) (Supp.
Iv, 1969).
71 See Bromberg, Exchange Offers, supra note 3, at 813.
72 See authorities cited notes 75-76 infra. See generally Schwartz, Personal Liabil-
ities of Directors of an Acquiring Company, 4 MERGERS & AcQuisiONs 4 (No. 2,
Mar.-Apr. 1969).
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tion of assets or capitalization, or a marked deviation from the
kind of business previously conducted.73
D. Offeror Securityholders (2.300)
1. Interests (2.310).- The securityholders of the offeror have
an interest in seeing that their values are enhanced, or at least not
diminished, by the offer.74  They are concerned not only in their
individual appraisals of the offer, but in the trading market reac-
tion to it. Since this will be gauged largely by the current and
projected effect on earnings per share, they are especially interested
in the dilution effect of the offer (if it is an exchange offer) or
the diversion of assets (if it is a cash offer). So far as price goes,
the interests of securityholders of the offeror are directly contrary
to those of holders of target securites. The former want a low
price, the latter a high one.
2. Safeguards (2.320).- The safeguards for securityholders
of the offeror include resort to the market to sell their securities or
to buy target securities if they regard the offer price as injuriously
high to the offeror. In this instance they may have also a state law
cause of action for waste or negligence;75 if timely brought, an
injunction against the offer may issue. Or later monetary relief
against the directors and executives may be granted. However,
given the judicial deference to business judgment, the security-
holders' chances of success are relatively slight. They improve if
73 For further discussion, see sec. (2.340) infra.
74 Some offers have produced serious reverses for offerors. General Host reportedly
lost $50 million on its 1969 exchange offer for Armour when it resold its holdings to
Greyhound. N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1970, at 55, col. 1 (city ed.). Liquidonics lost $17
million on its cash offer for UMC Industries, when it later disposed of the securities
under pressure to pay its debts. When a Mouse Tries to Swallow an Elephant...,
FORBES, Mar. 1, 1970, at 44; N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 1969, at 33, col. 6. International
Controls had a $15 million paper loss on its offer for Electronic Spedalty by the time
the litigation reached the appellate court, 5 months after the offer. Electronic Spe-
dalty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 947 (2d Cir. 1969). By
early 1970, LTV had a $212 million paper loss on Jones & Laughlin shares bought for
$550 million cash in mid-1968. FORBES, Mar. 15, 1970, at 57.
Losses of this kind are inevitably reflected in the value of the offeror's securities.
General Host common was selling at $40 per share a couple of months before it made
its offer for Armour in January 1969. A year later it was around $12 per share.
Liquidonics took a more spectacular nosedive, from $114 to $13 per share. International
Controls went from $46 to $13 per share in early 1970. LTV common dropped from
$48 to $24 per share. The offers were not the only factors. 1969 was a year of gen-
eral declines. For a tabulation of 22 tender offers and the later market values of the
securities involved, see The Morning After, FoRBES, Feb. 1, 1970, at 15-16.
75 See Norte & Co. v. Huffines, 304 F. Supp. 1096, af'd, 416 F.2d 1189 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 38 U.S.L.W. 3367 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1970) (judgment for $3.2 million
plus interest).
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the offer involves self-dealing or conflict of interest, notably if
management of the offeror has substantial holdings in the target
company. 7
Another safeguard of sorts exists if securityholder approval is
necessary. Examples include: (a) charter amendment to author-
ize additional shares, (b) New York and American Stock Exchange
requirements for shareholder approval of an acquisition which in-
creases the outstanding shares by 20 percent,77 (c) occasional statu-
tory provisions with the same effect,78 (d) charter or indenture re-
quirements for approval by senior securityholders of some kinds of
acquisitions or debt increases, and (e) approval advised by counsel
because of conflict of interest or importance of the transaction.
By contrast, there is usually no corporate law requirement for
shareholder approval of debt securities or warrants, or for debt-
security holder approval of anything. The Stock Exchanges call
for a shareholder vote if new securities of any kind will be issued
with a market value equal to 20 percent-or more of the market value
of outstanding common shares.79
The effectiveness of securityholder approval as a safeguard is
probably not very great, because of the proclivity of securityholders
to vote as management recommends. However, the proxy rules will
usually be applicable if the securities whose vote is sought are listed
on a stock exchange or are held of record by as many as 500
persons.8 0 The proxy rules add safeguards in the form of required
disclosures81 and a general ban on false, misleading or incomplete
solicitations.82
Disclosure from other sources may help to protect securityholders
of the offeror although it is not aimed at them. Disclosure in a
76 Id. Also note the allegations under state and federal law in Surowitz v. Hilton
Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363 (1966), rev'g 342 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1965), which in-
cluded a conflict of interest in the company's tender offer for its own shares and those of
an affiliated company. The suit was settled by insiders agreeing to pay $825 thousand to
the offeror company. N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1966, at 69, col. 6; Wall Street Journal,
Jan. 3, 1967, at 30, col. 2.
77 N.Y. STOCK EXciL Co. MANUAL A-283-84 (1963); AMERiCAN STOCK Exca.
Co. GuIDE § 713 (b) (1968).
7 8 Omo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.84(A), .01(R) (Page 1964).
7 9 See authorities cited note 77 supra.
80 Exchange Act § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1964) (applying to registered se-
curities; id. §§ 12(a), (g) (1), 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(a), (g) (1) (1964) (the latter in-
duding a further requirement that the issuer have at least $1 million in assets.
81 E.g., SEC Exchange Act Schedule 14A, Item 14, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1969),
reprinted in 2 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 26,871, at 20,137.
82 SEC Exchange Act Rule 14a-9(a), 17 C.F.L § 240.14a-9(a) (1969), reprinted in
2 CCH FED. SEC. L REP. 5 26,863, at 20,119.
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registration statement for the securities in an exchange offer is prin-
cipally for the benefit of the offerees. So is disclosure in a cash
offer. 8  But they alert the securityholders of the offeror to negli-
gence or conflict of interest by their management, and thus serve as
an informational safeguard to them and provide a possible basis
for litigation.
3. Restraints (2.330).- Securityholders as a group are not
bound by any particular restraints.
4. Critique (2.340).- The securityholder of the offeror has
been the forgotten man in most discussions of tender offers. But
he is vulnerable to real injury, which has occurred with some fre-
quency.8 4  This raises the questions whether he should be entitled
to further protections than he now has, and what these might be.
Although a tender offer is primarily a market transaction as
far as the target company is concerned, it is very much a corporate
transaction for the offeror. The economic and business results
may be quite similar to a merger with the target company or pur-
chase of its assets. Shareholder vote in the acquiring company is
commonly required by statute for mergers but not for asset trans-
actions unless they can be classed as de facto mergers. 85 If the
shareholder vote affords protection, it should be applied equally
to mergers, asset acquisitions and tender offers. The sensible dis-
tinction is one based on relative magnitude or quality of the trans-
action rather than its corporate form. Because the quality of an
acquisition is so hard to factor, much less judge - involving dif-
ferences in products, services, markets, finances, risk, etc. - there
is no feasible way to use it as a criterion for insisting on a share-
holder vote. The Stock Exchange rules appear to be on the right
track in calling for shareholder action for 20 percent (or greater)
increase in outstanding shares,86 and in applying the same idea to
comparable increases in value of all outstanding securities. One
may argue whether 20 percent is the right figure, but it seems rea-
sonable. Carrying the argument a step further would suggest the
need for approval by other securityholders who ordinarily possess
no voting rights. Probably they can be taken care of by inden-
ture or charter provisions.
83 Both are described more fully in sec. (2.721) infra.
84 See note 74 supra.
85 See, e.g., Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 440, 143 A.2d 25 (1958).
86 Cf. DEL. CODE ANN. it. 8, § 251(f) (1953), as amended, (Supp. 1968) (dis-
pensing with shareholder vote in a merger which increases the outstanding shares by
15 percent or less).
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It is hard to believe that shareholder approval itself accom-
plishes very much - except protection of management - given
the usual response to a management proxy solicitation. It does,
however, acquaint the shareholders with the transaction, and induce
management to consider their interests more carefully in shaping
an offer. This benefit must be weighed against the inevitable de-
lay, and its certain tendency to raise the price at which cash ten-
der offers would have to be made if they were known in advance.
(The problem already exists for exchange offers, mergers and asset
purchases.)
Shareholder vote assumes greater significance if there is a con-
test. While a fight might develop among existing holders over a
proposed acquisition, it is highly probable in a tender offer only if
the target company (or one of its allies) takes the offensive. In
short, broader shareholder approval in the offeror company would
mainly give the target company a new battlefield. It is hard to
justify on this basis, since the market is the more appropriate battle-
ground.
Another sally at the problem of protection of offeror security-
holders might be by calling for their ratification or retroactive ap-
proval. The odds are that this would be equally formalistic or, if
the target company opposed the offer, just a rerun of the contest.
Moreover, precautions would have to be devised to keep a ratifi-
cation vote from becoming a device to repudiate an offer which
turns out badly for the offeror.
Rather more can be said for some kind of appraisal right, of
the kind given in mergers, 7 based on value preceding the announce-
ment of the offer.88 This would give substantial protection
against offers injurious to securityholders of the offeror company.
The problem would be to find a remedy that does not kill the
patient. If all holders could wait for the market reaction to the
offer, then claim against the offeror any drop in value of their
holdings, the offeror might easily be bankrupted.
Unless their advance approval happens to be needed, there is
no requirement that securityholders of the offeror be notified of
87 For a survey of appraisal rights in different forms of corporate combination,
see Note, The Right of Shareholders Dissenting from Corporate Combination to De-
mand Cash Payment for Their Shares, 72 HARV. L REV. 1132 (1959).
8 8 Some states are now denying appraisal rights for holders of actively traded
securities. E.g., DELI CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(k) (1953), as amended, (Supp. 1968);
Ch. 78.538, [1969] Nev. Acts. The underlying idea is reasonable: the trading market
provides an objective valuation and a means of payment. But it fails to take into ac-
count an adverse market reaction to a bad merger or similar transaction.
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the offer. They may, to be sure, see the newspaper ads that are
directed to target securityholders or learn in other indirect ways.
Even if this occurs, it may be slow, reducing the efficacy of their
resort (if they so choose) to the market, which has perhaps reacted
much faster and in a direction unfavorable to them. Notice by
mail to holders of offeror securities would give them some slight
additional protection, too late probably to use the market effec-
tively, but perhaps soon enough to seek an injunction if there is
good cause for one. Whether it would be worth the cost, partic-
ularly if copies of the prospectus had to be disseminated in an ex-
change offer, is open to question.
A simple informational protection could be given the security-
holder of the offeror at slight cost. This would be a pro forma
financial statement (including earnings per share) showing the ef-
fect of the tender offer if successful (or, more usefully, at various
possible levels of success). As a matter of administrative practice,
this is now required in a registered exchange offer, but need not be
distributed to securityholders of the offeror. It is not required at
all in a cash offer.
E. Offeror Constituents (2.400)
1. Interests (2.410).- Other constituents of the offeror may
have interests in the offer, although the possibilities are too diverse
to generalize very helpfully on them. For example, a supplier to
the offeror may be hurt if the target company is itself a present or
potential supplier, or helped if it is a potential customer. A
labor union may feel the impact if a rival union represents em-
ployees in the target company. Customers of the offeror may be
affected if the target company is a present or potential competitor
of the offeror, or customer of it. Agencies administering the anti-
trust laws are concerned too with the anticompetitive possibilities of
the offer. Creditors of the offeror may be affected if its financial
condition is weakened. So may debtors, less directly, by pressures
to accelerate their payments.
2. Safeguards (2.420) .- Some of these constituents may pro-
tect themselves against adverse effects of a tender offer, for ex-
ample, by loan agreements or collective bargaining contracts.
Some may protect themselves by suits under the antitrust laws or
the labor laws. All have at least theoretical resort to the securities
market (to buy or sell the securities involved in the offer or to
make a counter or competing offer) and to the broader markets for
TENDER OFFERS
their inputs and outputs (to compensate for changes in their rela-
tions with the tender offeror). As a group they are given no
protection by the corporate or securities laws. They may have
some incidental protection from the disclosures required by the
securities laws, e.g., as to the offeror's plans for the target com-
pany.S9
3. Restraints (2.430).- There are no special restraints on the
members of these groups, as such, relative to a tender offer.
4. Critique (2.440).- There is no very strong argument that
these groups should have protection against tender offers. Perhaps
a stronger claim can be made that they need protection against
possible business changes in the wake of tender offers, but this
seems sufficiently covered by contract rights, labor and antitrust
law.9
o
These groups, and their opposite numbers in the target com-
pany,9' offer the best argument for imposing a public interest stan-
dard on acquisitions (including tender offers) and establishing
some sort of tribunal to apply it. But, in view of their other pro-
tections, such a claim seems far too weak to justify so radical a
limitation.
F. Target Company (2.500)
1. Interests (2.510).- The target company's interest- as
an entity distinct from its management and securityholders - is
perhaps the hardest to define. In this sense a corporation has no
concern with shifts in ownership of its outstanding securities. It
simply acquires new owners, in the best tradition of transferable
securities. The possible consequences of a change in ownership
- looting and the other examples suggested earlier 2 - are of
plainer impact on the corporation. Yet change is not inherently
detrimental to a corporation, and the mere possibility of change
even less so. Perhaps the most that can be said here is that the
corporation has a legitimate interest in any adverse economic ef-
fects that the tender offer and resulting shift in ownership may
bring.
As examined later,"3 the tender offer gives an unusual twist to
89 See authorities cited note 51 supra.
0 1 disclaim any expertise in labor and antitrust laws and must leave it to others to
evaluate their adequacy as to tender offers.
9 1 See sec. (2.900) infra.
92 SeC (1.400) supra.
93 Sec. (2.610) infra.
19701
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21: 613
the usual split between ownership (securityholders) and control
(management) of the target company. In most conflicts arising
from the split, the force (including economic power) of the com-
pany (wielded by its management) is pitted against the force of
the shareholders, and the former prevails. In a tender offer, a new
force and economic power - that of the offeror - appears and is
aligned with target securityholders to the extent that it offers
them money or securities for their holdings. This may reverse the
usual balance, and goes far toward explaining the antipathy of some
managements to tender offers.
2. Safeguards Against Success of the Offer, and Related Re-
straints (2.520).- Although it is far from dear that the target
company has a justifiable interest in defeating a tender offer, let
us assume that it does in order to examine the safeguards available
for that purpose. Note also that they can be used to improve the
offer (i.e., increase the price) as well as to defeat it.
a. Notice (2.521) .- A cash offer can, so far as federal
law is concerned, be made without any notice to the target com-
pany. Various advance filings were considered in early versions of
the Williams Bill, but Congress was persuaded not to enact them.9
A target company may become aware of an impending offer by
less official means, such as (a) increased trading in its securities,
suggesting accumulation by a prospective offeror, (b) feelers, usu-
ally through intermediaries, about possible merger, (c) direct ne-
gotiations for board representation or acquisition, and (d) rumors.
A potential offeror may be flushed out by the Williams Bill re-
quirement that it file an ownership statement with the SEC and the
target company 10 days after it acquires 10 percent of a class of
target company securities? 5 It must state the purpose of its acquisi-
tion and, if it seeks control, its plans for the target company.9 6
9 4 For further discussion and citations to the legislative history, see A. BROMBERG,
supra note 2, § 6.3 (421); Bromberg, Tender Offers, supra note 2, at 487-88.
9 Exchange Act § 13(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (Supp. IV, 1969). Persons
acting together are lumped for the 10 percent measure. Id. § 13(d) (3), 15 U.S.C. §
78m(d)(3).
eId. § 13(d)(1)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(C); SEC Exchange Act Schedule 13D,
Item 4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1969), reprinted in 2 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5
26,853, at 20,107-4. These do not specifically call for disclosure of intent to make a
tender offer, but failure to reveal an existing plan for a tender offer might well make the
statement misleading, involving possible sanctions under sections 18 (a) and 32 (a) of
the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 78r(a), ff(a) (1964)] and perhaps the general anti-
fraud Rule lob-5 [SEC Exchange Act Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1969)], and,
if a tender offer shortly follows, section 14(e) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78n(e)
(Supp. IV, 1969)]. The 10 percent ownership report required by Exchange Act §
16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1964), need not be filed until the 10th of the following
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Expectant tender offerors rarely cross the 10 percent line, partly to
avoid this requirement, partly to avoid possible short-swing in-
sider liability97 if the offer fails and they choose to resell their hold-
ings, and partly because trading market accumulation of more
than 10 percent is likely to be costly, conspicuous "and expensive.
Thus it is not uncommon for the offeror to hold 9 or 9.9 percent
when it first reveals itself to target company management for dis-
cussions. Senator Williams has 'introduced a bill which would re-
duce the filing level to 5 percent and provide an earlier warn-
ing. 98
An exchange offer normally provides ample advance warning
since it must be registered with the SEC long before it becomes ef-
fective. SEC filings are public records and widely reported in the
financial press. Even earlier than filing, the offeror almost invari-
ably has to ask the target company for information about the tar-
get company to be included in the registration statement.99
b. Negotiations (2.522).- If the target company has in-
terests to protect, the effective time for it to act is before the of-
fer ends, and before it begins if it has the opportunity. Negotia-
tion may produce beneficial contracts or commitments from the of-
feror. (The target company's quid pro quo can be the security-
holders list, recommendations to holders to accept the offer, or
mere neutrality.) Beyond this, the target company can fight 'the
offer in a number of ways.100
c. Communications (2.523).- The target company has es-
tablished communication channels with target securityholders and
the advantage of inertia on its part. It may have special influ-.
month, which will usually be later than 10 days after reaching 10 percent. And it does
not have the broad "group" concept of :Exchange Act § 13(d) (3), 15 U.S.C. §
78m(d)(3) (Supp. IV, 1969), by which the 10 percent level may be reached much
sooner in cooperative purchases of, say, a company, its officers, and other allies.
For examples of the "group' concept in section 13(d)(3), see Bath Indus., Inc. v.
Blot, 305 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Wis. 1969), and, in a tender offer context, the allega-
tions in Sg 14-15, 19-21 of the complaint in SEC v. Madison Square Garden Corp.,
summarized in [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. a 92,493, at 98,306 (S.D.N.Y.,
filed Oct. 6, 1969).
97 Exchange Act § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964).
98 S. 3431, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 1(2) (1970).
90 SEC Securities Act Form S-1, General Instructions, 5 F, mentioned in 17 C.F.R. §
239.11 (1969), reprinted in 1 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 9 7122, at 6202; 5 8006, at 7015.
The information on the target company may be omitted to the extent it is not avail-
able; a showing of request to obtain it is necessary. SEC Securities Act Rule 409(b),
17 C.F.R. § 230A09(b) (1969), reprinted in 1 CCH FED. SEC. L REP. 5 5807, at
5093.
100See sec. (1.500) supra.
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ence with some holders, notably those who are employees or busi-
ness associates. And it may have control over some of them, e.g.,
its subsidiaries and its profit sharing or other employee benefit
trusts, sufficient to prevent them from tendering or selling.
In communicating with its securityholders the target company
is limited by the antifraud provisions, mainly section 14(e) of the
1934 Act and Rule lob-5. In addition, if the offer is not regis-
tered under the 1933 Act, the Williams Bill sharply curtails target
company communication prior to an SEC filing by it. All it can
say is management is studying the offer and will make a recom-
mendation by a specified date (at least 10 days before expiration
of the offer), and ask securityholders to defer decision until re-
ceiving the recommendation.101 The required SEC filing by the
target company includes copies of the target company's recommen-
dation, the reasons for it, data on target security transactions by
the target company (and its officers, directors and affiliates) within
the past 60 days. 02 After filing with the SEC, the target company
can say what it wants, but must include in any written recommenda-
tion much of the data filed with the SEC, especially the "reasons."' 0 3
Stating reasons which are specific enough to be meaningful, disin-
terested enough to be persuasive, and honest enough to withstand
the antifraud provisions is far from easy, and target companies
might conceivably be deterred from saying anything by this Hobson's
choice.
On the other side of the communication picture, the target com-
pany has no general obligation to give internal information to the
offeror. Denying requests for data may raise obstacles to the of-
fer. 0 4
d. Market Operations (2.524).- The target company can
fight the offer in the trading market. This may take the form of
buying target securities, for multiple purposes including raising
their price above the offer price in order to discourage tenders
(as well as arbitrage purchases with a view to tender), and decreas-
'
0 1 SEC Exchange Act Rule 14d-2(f), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(f) (1969), reprinted
in 2 CCH FED. SEC. L REP. 5 26,886A, at 20,152. For more comprehensive discus-
sion, see A. BROMBERG, supra note 2, § 6.3(636); Bromberg, Tender Offers, supra note
2, at 522-23.
10 2 SEC Exchange Act Rule 14d-4, 17 C.F.RL § 240.14d-4 (1969), reprinted it; 2
CCH FED. SEC L. REP. 5 26,887, at 20,152. For further discussion, see A. BROMBERG,
stPra note 2, §§ 6.3(630)-(634); Bromberg, Tender Offers, supra note 2, at 519-22.
103 SEC Exchange Act Rule 14d-4(c), 17 C.F.L § 240.14d-4(c) (1969), reprinted
in 2 CCH FED. SEC L REP. 9 26,887, at 20,153.
10 4 See sec. (2.125) supra.
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ing the shares available for tender. Many restraints operate on
such purchases:
(1) There must be adequate surplus under the governing
corporate law and indentures,"0 5 as well as available cash or credit.
(2) The purchases must be characterizable as a defense of
corporate policy rather than of management position.0 6 But this
seldom presents a serious impediment to a thoughtful minute writer.
(3) Under the Williams Bill, and implementing SEC rules,
a target company in a cash offer has an advance disclosure require-
ment before it can purchase any of its equity securities. In a filing
with the SEC it must identify the securities to be bought; the
classes of sellers and the markets to be used; the purpose of the pur-
chase and the planned disposition of the securities; the source and
amount of funds to be used and if any have been borrowed, a de-
scription of the transaction and parties. Moreover, the target com-
pany must have given the substance of the same information to its
equity securityholders sometime within 6 months preceding the pur-
chases. 107
The target company, persons controlling it, controlled by it, or
under common control with it, and persons subject to control by
any of them, are all considered part of a single group. Purchases
by any of them are deemed purchases by the target company, and
cannot be made before the SEC filing and notice to security-
holders.0 8 Apparently the filing must contain information on
their purposes, planned disposition, fund sources, etc. The control
group concept typically covers officers, directors, employees, major
securityholders, and profit sharing or other employee benefit trusts
controlled by the target company or its officers, directors or em-
ployees. Target company allies who join in buying its securities
are classed with the target company as a single "person"10 but
10 5 See, e.g., Israels, Limitations on the Corporate Purchase of Its Own Shares, 22
Sw. LJ. 755, 755-58 (1968).
106 Compare Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1964), and
Kors v. Carey, 39 Del. Ch. 47, 158 A.2d 136 (Ch. 1960), with Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del.
Ch. 14, 187 A.2d 405 (Sup. Ct. 1962). For a recent application of this theory to hold
the directors of the Denver Post liable for purchasing its shares to defeat an offer
by Samuel L Newhouse, see Wall Street Journal, Mar. 9, 1970, at 21, col 1 (Southwest
ed.).
For a suggested alternative test, see sec. (2.560) infra.
107 SEC Exchange Act Rule 13e-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-1 (1969), reprinted in 2
CCH FED. SEC. L REP. 5 26,852, at 20,107-3. The rle takes effect only when the
tender offeror files its- Schedule 13D with the SEC and notifies the target company.1 0 8 Exchange Act § 13 (e) (2), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e) (2) (Supp. IV, 1969).
1091d. § 14(d) (2), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (2) (Supp. IV, 1969).
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the consequences are not very clear. 110 Misrepresentations or omis-
sions in the required information probably give the tender offeror
standing to sue."' Appropriate relief would normally be an injunc-
tion against target company purchases until release of complete
and accurate information."-2 The trickiest element of this disclos-
ure is the purpose of the purchase. If the stated purpose is to hold
the shares for employee incentives or future acquisitions, it is open
to challenge that this is not the real purpose. A stated purpose of
protecting the corporation against feared depredation as a result of
the offer may be similarly attacked. A stated purpose of driving the
market price up probably increases vulnerability to a charge of ma-
nipulation. The need to state a purpose is something of a deter-
rent to buying at all."" However, similar reasons will have to be
given for the target company's recommendation to securityholders
to accept or reject the offer.""
(4) The antifraud and antimanipulative provisions of the
1934 Act may apply, although their limits are only beginning to
emerge. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held
110 One consequence might be regulation of solicitations by the allies, but the SEC
has not made any special rules for them. Any solicitor is subject to SEC Exchange
Act Rule 14d-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-4 (1969), reprinted in 2 CCH FED. SEc. L REP.
26,887, at 20,152.
Another consequence might be disclosure of the allies' market activities. But the
present disclosure requirement for the target company is in SEC Exchange Act Rule
13e-1, 17 C.F.R. § 2 4 0.13e-1 (1969), reprinted in 2 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. S 26,852,
at 20,107-3, promulgated under Exchange Act § 13 (e), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e) (Supp. IV,
1969). The latter has a separate "group" concept based on control rather than cooper-
ation. Id. § 13(e)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e)(2).
A third possible consequence is the timing of the target company's disclosure re-
quirement. Arguably, if an ally begins to buy first, its actions constitute purchases by
the offeror, which must be preceded by SEC filing and communication to shareholders.
But this interpretation does violence to the separation of sections 13(e) and 14(d), and
their distinct lumping provisions, sections 13 (e) (2) and 14(d) (2).
Another possible consequence is joint and several liability for any damages caused
by violations. However, the lumping language of section 14(d)(2) is limited to "this
subsection," meaning section 14(d), and presumably is inapplicable to, say, the fraud
provision, section 14(e).
Additional questions arise if the allies are investment companies. See Thomas,
supra note 40.
111See note 58 supra. A target securityholder will probably have standing too.
See authorities cited note 178 infra.
112 See text accompanying note 121 infra.
13 A. BROMBERG, supra note 2, § 6.3(642); Bromberg, Tender Offers, supra note
2, at 527.
114 Exchange Act § 14(d) (4), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (4) (Supp. IV, 1969); SEC x-
change Act Rule 14d-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-4 (1969), reprinted in 2 CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 5 26,887, at 20,152; SEC Exchange Act Schedule 14D, Item 1(b), 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14d-101 (1969), reprinted in 2 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 26,889, at 20,154. See
A. BROMBERG, supra note 2, § 6.3 (633) (3); Bromberg, Tender Offers, supra note 2,
at 519-21.
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that large purchases of target securities by an ally of the target
company (its proposed merger partner) violated section 9(a)(2)
of the 1934 Act and Rule lob-5.115 The critical aspect was that the
buyer was simultaneously but secretly reselling 120,000 of the
170,000 shares it bought. The resales were to institutional investors
at $5 a share less than the purchases, and the court regarded them
as deceptively distorting the supply-demand picture in the market.
The court carefully refrained from holding that buying in opposi-
tion to a tender offer is by itself a violation.
(5) If the target company is currently engaged in a distribu-
tion of its securities - in acquisitions (including a deferred issue
agreement calling for additional shares based on earnings or market
prices), or to satisfy outstanding warrants, convertibles or em-
ployee options - it may find itself prohibited entirely from buying
its own securities. 11"
Although there will rarely be enough time, a target company
might make a competing tender offer for its own shares, subject
generally to the same restrictions listed above1 17
Another possible tactic in an exchange offer is to sell short the
securities being offered, in hopes of driving down the price and
reducing the appeal of the offer. This may fall afoul of the anti-
fraud or antimanipulative provisions.
Yet another move is for the target company to make a cash
offer (there will hardly be sufficient time for an exchange offer)
for securities of the offeror, or to buy them in the trading markets.
This raises a number of perplexities, including the chance that each
will succeed and obtain control of the other."'
e. Disclosure Obligations and Restrictions on the Offeror
(2.525).- The target company, like its securityholders, is afforded
some protection by the disclosure and antifraud portions of the Wil-
liams Bill and Rule 10b-5."9  It has standing to sue for violations
115 Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d. 787 (2d Cir. 1969).
116 SEC Exchange Act Rule 10b-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6 (1969), reprinted in 2
CCH FED. SEC. L REP. 5 26,745, at 20,062. For the rules of thumb which have
evolved in this area, see A. BROMBERG, supra note 2, § 7.3; Foshay, Market Activities
of Participants it Securities Distributions, 45 VA. L REv. 907 (1959); Whitney,
Rule 10b-6: The Special Study's Rediscovered Rule, 62 MIc-. L REV. 567 (1964);
Comment, The SEC's Rule 10b-6: Preserving a Competitive Market During Distribu-
tions, 1967 DuKE LJ. 809.
"17 See text accompanying notes 105-16 supra.
118 1or one of the few cases dealing with drcular control as a matter of corporate
law, see Robotham v. Prudential Ins. Co., 64 N.J. Eq. 673, 53 A. 842 (1903).
1 9 See sec. (2.721) infra.
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of most or all of these provisions. 20 Appropriate relief will typi-
cally be an injunction against continuation or consummation of
the offer, long enough to cure the violation, and coupled with a
right to withdraw securities already tendered. A purely prohibi-
tory injunction is unlikely to achieve the statutory objectives or
the equitable requirement of interest balancing. 2'
If the offer is one of exchange, it will normally have to be reg-
istered under the 1933 Act, affording further informational safe-
guards. These include advance warning'22 and disclosures of weak-
ness in the offeror that can be turned into deadly publicity against
the offer. 2  While it is not clear whether the target company has
12 0 For violations of the antifraud tender provision, Exchange Act § 14(e), 15
U.S.C. § 78n(e) (Supp. IV, 1969), see Butler Aviation Int'l, Inc. v. Comprehensive De-
signers, Inc., [Current Binder] CCH FMn. SEC L. REP. 5 92,557, at 98,541 (2d Cir.
Jan. 8, 1970 )(exchange offer); Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp.,
409 F.2d 937, 944-46 (2d Cir. 1969) (cash offer). See also Armour & Co. v. General
Host Corp., 296 F. Supp. 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (not discussing standing but entertain-
ing a suit by the target company in an exchange offer).
For violations of the general antifraud provision, SEC Exchange Act Rule lOb-5,
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1969), see the authorities (which are divided) collected in
A. BROMBERG, supra note 2, § 6.3(1030) nn.58.2-A; Bromberg, Tender Offers, supra
note 2, at 552-53. See also Armour & Co. v. General Host Corp., supra. The dis-
trict court found Rule lOb-5 standing in Butler Aviation Intel, Inc. v. Comprehensive
Designers, Inc., [Current Binder] CCH FEa. SEC. L. REP. 5 92,543, at 98,495 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 24, 1969), but the Second Circuit declined to pass on this point since it agreed
that there was standing under section 14(e). Id. [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L
REP. 5 92,557, at 98,541 (2d Cir. Jan. 8, 1970).
For violations of the disclosure and regulatory provisions, Exchange Act § 14(d),
15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (Supp. IV, 1969), see Electronic Specialty Co. v. International
Controls Corp., supra (cash offer); Pan American Sulphur Co. v. Susquehanna Corp.,
[Current Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 92,473, at 98,233 (W.D. Tex. May 28,
1969), rev'd, [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 92,610, at 98,749 (5th
Cir. Mar. 13, 1970) (cash offer); cf. Bath Indus., Inc. v. Blot, 305 F. Supp. 526 (E.D.
Wis. 1969) (implied standing under section 13 (d), companion to section 14(d). See
also Armour & Co. v. General Host Corp., supra.
For violation of the margin rules, Exchange Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 78g (Supp. IV,
1969), see Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 303 F. Supp. 1354
(S.D.N.Y. 1969) (finding, however, no violation).
1 21 See Butler Aviation Int'l, Inc. v. Comprehensive Designers, Inc., [Current
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 92,557, at 98,541 (2d Cit. Jan. 8, 1970) (affirming
with great reluctance a flat prohibition against an exchange offer, and expressing
strong preference for curative disclosure and withdrawal rights); Electronic Specialty
Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 947 (2d Cir. 1969), same case below
296 F. Supp. 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (noting that the offer was near the top of the trading
market range for the target securities and that holders might never get another simi-
lar opportunity); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 303 F. Supp.
1344, 1353-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (requiring disclosure of antitrust aspects); Armour &
Co. v. General Host Corp., 296 F. Supp. 470, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (target security-
holders should not be deprived of choice between exchange offer and cash offer).
See also cases cited note 141 infra. For a fuller discussion, see A. BROMBERG, supra
note 2, §§ 6.3(1100)-(1130); Bromberg, Tender Offers, supra note 2, at 555-66.
122 See authorities cited note 99 supra.
123 Here are some examples:
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standing to sue for violation of the 1933 Act registration require-
ments, 124 any violation by way of misrepresentation or nondisclos-
ure will almost certainly violate section 14(e) of the 1934 Act, for
which standing is recognized. 25 If the offeror seeks approval from
its securityholders for any aspect of the offer, the proxy rules pro-
vide some of the'same informational safeguards for the target com-
pany as does a registration statement. It is uncertain whether the
target company has any standing to sue for misrepresentation or
other violations in a proxy solicitation of the offeror's holders. Its
interests may be too remote for legal protection.126
Relief for securities violations by the offeror will commonly be
a curative injunction, but can be more thoroughgoing. 27
Although without formal standing to initiate SEC action, the
target company may confer with the SEC and request it to take in-
Wall Street Journal, May 19, 1969, at 21, col. 1 (Southwest ed.) ("Why B.F.
Goodrich Doesn't Need Northwest" - stressing losses of Northwest and favorable
earnings prospects of Goodrich, and quoting from Northwest's registration statement a
paragraph on uncertainties in its ability to pay interest and dividends).
Wall Street Journal, Jan. 28, 1969, at 21, col. 3 (Southwest ed.) ("Sharon [Steel)
Stockholders, Your Board Urges You to Accept the Cyclops Offer. Four Dangers in
NVFs Offer" - listing insufficient earnings of NVF to pay interest on the debentures
being offered, bookkeeping changes made to keep NVF from reporting a loss, NVF's
uncertain future (quoted from its prospectus), and its desire to use target company's re-
sources to bail itself out).
Wall Street Journal, Jan. 9, 1969, at 15, col. 1 (Southwest ed.) (Armour quoting
at length from General Host's registration statement).
Perhaps the ultimate in this line is reported in Wall Street Journal, July 1, 1969,
at 11, col. 1 (Southwest ed.) ("World's First Comic Prospectus, Read about 'Funny
Money,' How Emerson Turned the Profit Comer and Other Factual but Hilarious
Stuff" - National Presto Industries quoting at length from National Union Electric's
prospectus on such subjects as the offeror's earnings decline and dependence on govern-
meat contracts, the taxability of the transaction, and the expenses of the offer).
124 Compare Symington Wayne Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 383 F.2d 840, 842
(2d Cir. 1967) (indicating that standing of target company is an open question, and
denying relief on other grounds), with Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp.,
[Current Binder] CCH FED. SEC L REP. 5 92,510, at 98,372 (2d Cir. Nov. 6, 1969)
(finding violation in suit by rival exchange offeror without discussion standing).
3.2 5 See cases cited note 120 supra. Armour & Co. v. General Host Corp., 296 F.
Supp. 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), included claims of violation of section 17(a) of the Se-
curities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1964). As stated, the court permitted the suit with-
out discussion of standing.
1 2 6 But cf. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEC.' L
REP. 9 92,556, at 98,532 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1970), holding that a shareholder whose
proxies are being solicited establishes a violation by showing the materiality of the
misrepresentation or omission, without any need to prove that it caused the transaction
in question, i.e., merger into the parent. Since the proxy rules are designed for the
benefit of the solicitees, there is more justification for easing their right to sue than
the right of another corporation indirectly affected by the outcome of the solicitation.
See also text accompanying notes 65-66 supra.
12 7 See text accompanying notes 121 supra, 141 infra.
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formal or formal steps against the offeror.2 8 Similar addresses may
be made to other federal or state agencies having jurisdiction. 2
Some of the required terms of a cash tender offer, while in-
tended to benefit the target securityholders, also help the target
company. The 10-day minimum duration of an offer, and the re-
quirement that tenders made during this period be taken up pro
rataao (rather than first-come-first-served) give the target com-
pany more time to oppose the offer, and let it urge its security-
holders not to be stampeded into tendering. The right to withdraw
tenders for the first 7 days of the Offer Period'' may allow the
target company to induce the revocation of some tenders that have
already been made, although it will rarely be able to act fast enough
to accomplish this.
f. Antitrust Laws (2.526).- The antitrust laws are de-
signed to preserve competition. In particular, section 7 of the
Clayton Act 82 bars an acquisition if its effect may be substantially
to lessen competition or to tend to create a monopoly. A target
company has standing to sue and may obtain, on appropriate show-
ing, varying degrees of injunctive relief against an anticompetitive
tender offer.' So, of course, may the government.8
128 For a description of one series of target company efforts at the SEC in opposi-
tion to an exchange offer registration, see Armour & Co. v. General Host Corp., 296
F. Supp. 470, 472-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). For a formal SEC proceeding against a cash
offer filing, see In re Susquehanna Corp., [Current Binder] CCH FE. SEc. L. REP. 5
77,741, at 83,692 (SEC Hearing Examiner Aug. 5, 1969). There is no indication
what role the target company played in obtaining the hearing.
129 See Northwest Industries, Inc., Prospectus, at 8-9 (Apr. 16, 1969) (recount-
ing ICC proceedings); Proposed Exchange Offer by Northwest Industries, Inc. of Certain
Debentures, Preferred Stock, and Warrants to Holders of Shares of Common Stock,
of the B. F. Goodrich Co., reprinted in CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. 5 70,816, at 66,824
(Ohio Dep't of Commerce, Div. of Securities, May 1, 1969); Offer by General Host
Corp. for Common Stock and Debentures of Armour & Co., reprinted in CCH BLUE
SKY L. REP. 5 70,805, at 66,808 (Wis. Comm'r of Securities, Feb. 10, 1969).
180Exchange Act § 14(d)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (Supp. IV, 1969), sets the
10-day pro rata takeup period, which effectively requires a minimum Offer Period of
10 days. However, the provision, by its own terms, does not apply to an offer for all
securities tendered, since the offeror is not discriminating among early and late
tenders. See A. BROMBERG, supra note 2, §§ 6.3(530)-(540); Bromberg, Tender Of-
fers, supra note 2, at 509-13.
131 Exchange Act § 14(d)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (Supp. IV, 1969); A.
BROMBERG, supra note 2, §§ 6.3 (520) -(524); Bromberg, Tender Offers, supra note 2,
at 506-08.
13 2 Clayton Act, ch. 25, § 7, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18
(1964).
'33 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 303 F. Supp. 1344 (S.D.N.Y.
1969) (cash offer financed by competitor of target company). But see Lunkenheimer
Co. v. Condec Corp., 268 F. Supp. 667 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). MGM's relief was short
lived; the offeror quickly found financing from a non-competitor and the offer pro-
ceeded. See 303 F. Supp. at 1354.
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Acquisition by the target company of a competitor of the of-
feror, or merger of the target company into such a competitor, may
force the offeror to give up. 35
g. Delay (2.527) - Stalling actions by the target company
can be highly protective.:36 They may permit it to merge with a
friendly company or obtain a tender offer from one. Delay may
dissuade the offeror, especially in a cash offer with large commit-
ment fees which mount day by day with receding prospects of suc-
cess, or in an exchange offer during a declining market. Delay
will probably discourage arbitrageurs, inclining them not to buy, and
to sell the target securities they own; the first action reduces the
prospects of the offer, and the second may have a similar effect.
The main techniques of delay are administrative and legal pro-
ceedings of the kind discussed elsewhere. 7
3. Safeguards Against Assumption of Control (2.530).-
Various devices can be designed by the target company to thwart
the assumption of control by a successful offeror. These usually
focus on the nerve center of the corporation, the board of directors,
and operate to delay or prevent target company representatives from
coming onto the board. A mild technique (which many com-
panies already use) gives the existing board, even though less than a
quorum, the power to fill any vacancies which may exist from death
or resignation. This helps if directors are frightened, by the offer,
into quitting. To keep the offeror from exercising its shareholder
voting power to remove existing directors, it may be provided that
removal shall be only for cause, with elaborate and slow procedures
for determining cause. To keep the offeror from taking board
control through its voting power at the next regular election, the
board, in most states, can be staggered so that only one-third of its
directors (or perhaps even a smaller fraction) come up for election
each year.' 38 Elections can be delayed for awhile by failing to
call the annual meeting. Management retention of the proxy ma-
chinery might even keep the offeror (if it owns less than a majority
of the vote) from winning the seats that are up for contest. Stag-
134 United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 306 F. Supp. 766 (D. Conn.
1969); United States v. Northwest Indus., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 1066 (N.D. IMl. 1969).
For the character of these decrees, see note 8 supra.
135 Cf. Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969).
13 6 See Herzel, Strategy and Tactics in Stockholder Litigation, 15 PRAC. LW. 65,
66-70 (No. 5, May 1969); 11 CORP. PRAC COMMENTATOR 364, 365-71 (1969).
137 See text accompanying notes 121, 128-29 supra, note 141 infra.
138 E.g., ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 35 (1967).
1970]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21: 613
gered terms dilute the effectiveness of the offeror's holdings if
there is cumulative voting which might otherwise give it a minority
of the seats being contested. And cumulative voting itself can be
eliminated in most states.189
The devices just described can be in the charter or bylaws, or
both, depending on the applicable statute. To keep them from be-
ing undermined, they need reinforcement by appropriate restric-
tions on amendments. For example, it might be provided that the
bylaws may be amended only by the directors, or that certain
charter provisions can be changed only by a vote considerably higher
than the offeror controls through ownership.
Other obstacles to assumption of control (and, indeed, to the
success of the offer) include provisions in loan agreements or in-
dentures. Changes of board control, or acquisition by a person or
group of more than a designated percentage of the outstanding
shares, can be defined as events of default, accelerating the debt
unless waived by the creditor.140
Arrangements of this sort have their obvious problems of rigid-
ifying the corporation and appearing to serve the selfish interests
of management rather than the interests of the corporation. And
they can be harmful to the corporation if, despite their deterrent ef-
fect on tender offers, an offer is made and the corporation is sud-
denly faced with a large current liability.
If the offeror has committed violations, a court has broad dis-
cretion in imposing sanctions. On an appropriate showing of ir-
reparable injury to the target company (or its securityholders) and
balance of equities, a court may enjoin voting of shares acquired by
the offeror.' 41 However, the injunction is likely to be temporary.1'
Much the same is true for antitrust violations, although the in-
junction may be longer because of the complexity of trial on the
merits.143
139 See, e.g., Janney v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 387 Pa. 282, 128 A.2d 76 (1956).
140See Note, Defensive Tactics Employed by Incambent Managements in Con-
testing Tender Offers, supra note 11, at 1109.
14 1 Pan American Sulphur Co. v. Susquehanna Corp., [Current Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 92,473, at 98,233 (W.D. Tex. May 28, 1969), rev'd [Current
Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 92,610, at 98,749 (5th Cir. Mar. 13, 1970); cf. Bath
Indus., Inc. v. Blot, 305 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Wis. 1969) (group of securityholders pre-
liminarily enjoined from proceeding with plans to take control; failure to file informa-
tion required by Exchange Act § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (Supp. IV, 1969), a part
of the Williams Bill similar to Exchange Act § 14(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (Supp. IV,
1969) (no tender offer involved). For remedies available to the offeror, see authori-
ties cited note 59 supra.
142 See cases cited note 121 supra.
143 See note 8 supra. An agreement between the government and the offeror led
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If the offeror has committed securities violations, the target com-
pany may have a basis in the Uniform Commercial Code for refus-
ing to register transfer of securities to the offeror.1" The purpose
would be to deny the offeror the voting and distribution rights of
a registered holder of target securities. 145 But the target company
gets little protection here, since the thrust of the law is to facilitate
transfers rather than to impede them. 46 Moreover, the offeror
can beat this game by soliciting proxies with tenders.
4. Safeguards Against Economic Injury (2.540).- The target
to a voting trust for LTV's holdings in Jones & Laughlin. United States v. Ling-Temco-
Vought, Inc., Civil No. 69-438 (W.D. Pa., filed April 14, 1969),'summarized in 5
Trade Reg. Rep. 5 45,069, at 52,712 (Case 2045). A year later a new agreement al-
lowed LTV to take control on divesting itself of other companies. Wall Street Journal,
Mar. 9, 1969, at 26, col. 1 (Southwest ed.). See further discussion in note 8, supra.
144One possible basis is Uniform Commercial Code § 8-306(a)(2) [hereinafter
cited as UCC], by which a transferor (the tendering holder of target securities) war-
rants that his transfer (to the tender offeror) is "rightful." This has been construed
to mean compliance with the securities laws, but mainly the 1933 Act registration re-
quirements. See C. IsRAELs & E. GuTThAN, MODERN SECURTEs TRANsFER 404-07
(1967). It is arguable, but not decided, that fraud or statutory securities violations
by a transferee (tender offeror) make the transfer wrongful in this context. Whether
the issuer (target company) can use a transferor's (tendering securityholder's) war-
ranty against the transferee (tender offeror) is questionable. However, by a more im-
mediately pertinent provision, the issuer is obligated to register transfer only if the
transfer is in fact "rightfil" or is to a "bona fide purchaser." UCC § 8-401(1) (e).
The first term is undefined, but may, as noted above, relate to securities violations.
Bona fide purchaser is defined as a buyer (tender offeror) for value "in good faith and
without notice of any adverse claim." UCC § 8-302. Although the emphasis is on
ignorance of claims of third parties, it is broad enough to deny bona fide purchaser
status to the buyer (tender offeror) who is guilty of misconduct. Good faith means
honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned, i.e., the tender offer. UCC
§ 1-201(19).
An alternative basis for refusing registration of transfer is that violations by
the offeror may create adverse claims of tendering holders. By UCC § 8-306(1), the
presenter (i.e., the offeror or agent) warrants that he is entitled to registration. This
means there are no adverse claims that the transfer is wrongful under UCC § 8-301 (1)
because of a violation of the Securities Act of 1933. C IsRAELs & E. GuTrMAN, supra
at 904, 1202. Normally the target company (issuer) has an obligation to register trans-
fer if it has no duty to inquire into adverse claims. UCC § 8-401(1)(c). Such a duty
exists if (and apparently only if) it has received timely written notice or if it is
charged with notice from other documents it has acquired, an unlikely eventuality in
a tender offer. UCC § 8-403(1). Moreover, the notice language in UCC § 8-
403(1)(a), seems to embrace only an individual's claim on particular securities, thus
precluding a "class" notice by a cooperative securityholder for himself and all other
tendering holders. Constructive or actual notice from observed violations is probably
not notice for UCC purposes. See UCC § 8-403(3); C. ISRAELS & B. GtTFrMAN,
supra at 1210-11.
145 See UCC § 8-207(1).
146 The issuer may be liable for refusal to register or for unreasonable delay. UCC
§ 8-401(2); C. ISRAELS & B. GUTrMAN, supra note 144, at 902-03, 1219-21. Even if
there is notice of adverse claims, the issuer has only limited time in which to investi-
gate them and decide on its course of action. In effect, the burden shifts to the claim-
ant (tendering securityholder) to prevent the transfer by court order. UCC § 8-403 (2);
C. IsRAELs & B. GurnAAN, supra note 144, at 1211-14.
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company has little practical recourse against economic injury by
the offeror if the latter takes control. However, it has theoretical
causes of action for waste, mismanagement and fiduciary breach,
which may be asserted derivatively by a shareholder or by a bank-
ruptcy trustee or receiver. They may or may not be effective, de-
pending on the facts, the parties, the amount involved and many
other variables.
By advance planning the target company can create some ob-
stacles to economic injury by a controlling securityholder. High
shareholder voting requirements for a merger with a substantial
shareholder may bar a disadvantageous combination.1 47  Bans on
all conflict of interest transactions, particularly loans and maybe
even extraordinary dividends, may be written into the charter.
(For such provisions to be meaningful, they must be amendable
only by a comparably high vote.) Similar provisions can be in-
serted in loan agreements or indentures where they may carry
greater leverage and be harder to change. Techniques of this kind
can backfire by preventing the target company from making eco-
nomically desirable transactions.
The target company has a degree of practical protection deriv-
ing from the probability that the offeror, having bought it, will
want to help it rather than hurt it.
The target company lacks any very effective recourse against
actions of an unsuccessful offeror which depress the market value
of target securities. The existence of a cause of action is in doubt,
there are difficult elements of proof if causation is strictly en-
forced, and the target company may not have standing to sue un-
less some "manipulative acts in connection with any tender offer"'48
can be shown.
5. Critique (2.550).- It is hard to find gaps in the target com-
pany's safeguards. A number of restrictions operate on it, but these
seem, with one exception, to strike a reasonable balance. The ex-
ception is the inability to launch an immediate communications coun-
terattack to a surprise offer. The advance filing with the SEC 149
may hamper the target company more than it helps anyone that
benefits by such a requirement.
If anything, the target company is overprotected by the combina-
147 One may question whether a merger is disadvantageous to a corporation as dis-
tinct from its securityholders, its creditors or some of its other constituents. I will not
try to answer that question here.
148 Exchange Act § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (Supp. IV, 1969).
149 See text accompanying notes 101-02 supra.
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tion of control of its own structure, corporate law and securities
law.
The safeguards given a target company by the specific disclosure
and filing mandates of the Williams Bill are not available for an
insurance company unless the securities sought in the offer are listed
on a national exchange or are voluntarily registered under the 1934
Act. This is the combined result of the Williams Bill's limitation
to registered securities, 150 and the exemption from registration pro-
cured by the insurance industry in 1964,11 when most publicly held
over-the-counter-companies were required to register. Some states
have passed laws to protect insurance companies from takeovers,"52
and Senator Williams offered a 1970 amendment to include them
in the federal law. 5 3 Whether they should have the benefit of
federal law without its burdens is open to debate. A better argu-
ment can be made in behalf of their shareholders than in behalf
of the companies themselves.
6. A Suggested Corporate Law Test of Opposition Moves
(2.560).- Since a tender offer is an offer to target securityholders
via the market, I submit that the proper test for judging defensive
actions as a matter of corporate law is not the traditional one of
corporate policy rather than personal position. 54 Rather, it should
be whether the defensive action is reasonably calculated to benefit
shareholders in a market sense, that is, higher values for their se-
curities. Actions to obtain a higher offer, from the tender offeror
or another party, are appropriate by this standard. So are stock
splits and increases in the regular dividend rate. Short-term market
operations destined to defeat the offer are not. Nor, probably, are
increases in outstanding shares which are unlikely to produce a bet-
ter offer but only to defeat the pending one. On the other hand,
share increases which will raise earnings per share may pass the
test. 55 These might be acquisitions of operating businesses whose
'S0 Exchange Act§ 14(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (Supp. IV, 1969).
'51 Exchange Act § 12(g) (2) (G), 15 U.S.C. 781(g) (2) (G) (1964). For the
background, see W. CARY, POLrrIcs AND THE REGULATORY AGENCIES 113-17 (1967).
'
5 2 Conn. Pub. Act. No. 44 (1969); 40 PA. STAT. ANN. tit 40, § 459-6 (Supp.
1969). For an application of the former, see the IT&T-Hartford Fire acquisition de-
scribed in note 8 supra.
153 S. 3431,91st Cong., 2d Sess §§1(1), 2(1) (1970).
154 See cases cited note 106 supra.
155 See Northwest Indus., Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 709 (N.D. Ill.
1969). Goodrich, under the impetus of an exchange offer by Northwest, proposed to
issue 700 thousand of its shares to Gulf Oil Corp. for Gulf's half-interest in Goodrich-
Gulf Chemicals, Inc., a jointly owned subsidiary. In denying (after an evidentiary
hearing) a preliminary injunction against the issuance, the court relied primarily on
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earnings are higher per share of consideration issued than the tar-
get company is currently earning. Or they might be issues for cash
if there is convincing evidence that the cash can be used in the
target company to increase total earnings proportionally more than
the increase in outstanding shares.
The proposed test will not always be able to discriminate be-
tween offer-defeating and value-enhancing proposals, since some
actions may perform both functions. But it is a good deal more
relevant than the present test.
The suggestion is essentially a fiduciary test, but pointed to the
ultimate beneficiaries for whom the fiduciaries are supposed to be
acting - the target securityholders - rather than to the target
company as an entity. Like other fiduciary tests, the burden of
proof should be on the fiduciaries. The test would not, however,
preclude reference to the interests of other securityholders of the
target company or its other constituents, although these will usu-
ally be of less importance.
G. Target Company Management (2.600)
1. Interests (2.610).- In part, the interests of target company
management are those of the target company, discussed above,' "5
and of its securityholders, discussed later. 1 7  Ordinarily, what is
good for one is good for the other, particularly a rise in market
value of the company's securities. But a striking feature of the ten-
der offer is its capacity to drive an economic wedge between target
management and target securityholders. What is good, at least in
the short run, for the latter (a high value leading them to tender)
may be bad for the former. Members of management are threatened
with loss of their jobs and salaries, perhaps their stock options and
profit sharing plans. With these go power and prestige. Even
in favorable instances, they may be relegated to subordinate posi-
tions in a larger corporate complex. Their personal interests may
conflict sharply with the interests of the target company and its
securityholders.
But there can be real difficulty in untangling the corporate
and personal interests. Management will naturally identify its pro-
grams and policies, and its achievements and plans with the welfare
the business judgment rule but made something of the point that earnings per share
would rise 15 cents.
156 Sec. (2.510) supra.
157 Secs. (2.710), (2.810) infra.
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of the corporation (and its securityholders, employees and other
constituents) 1-s  More objectively, in all but the most grievous
cases, there is some corporate value in continuity of management
and the resulting stability.
In administering the antifraud and disclosure provisions, Judge
Friendly has admonished the courts against frustrating the desires
of tendering securityholders at the instance of incumbent manage-
ment.159
2. Safeguards (2.620).- The safeguards of target company
management are essentially those of the target company, described
earlier.10  Additionally, the management may have long-term con-
tracts assuring their compensation and perhaps their status as of-
ficers. Their positions as directors are not ordinarily a matter of
contract, but can to some degree be preserved by provisions in the
corporate charter 6 or agreements between the target company and
its creditors.
3. Restraints (2.630).- The principal restraint on target
company management is that it is supposed to put corporate and
shareholder interests above its own - a duty of loyalty. 2  More-
over it has some duty of care to make a reasonable investigation
and have a reasonable basis for its actions.'6 3
The courts, mainly using the business judgment rule, have been
hesitant to override management.'.
A further discussion of the restraints on target company man-
zgement appears later.0 5
4. Critique (2.640).-- The management of the target com-
158 See, e.g., Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1964), where
the buyout of a reputed raider was justified partly on the ground of the threat he posed
to the company's sales force and policy. On the validity of that policy, which included
deceptive trade practices, see Holland Furnace Co., 55 F.T.C. 55 (1958), and the later
history recounted in W. CARY, CASES, AND MAP ETALS ON COtPORATIONS 691-93
(4th ed. unabridg. 1969). , I I
159 Butler Aviation Int'l, Inc. v. Comprehensive Designers, Inc., [Current Binder]
CCH FED. SEc. L REP. 5 92,557, at 98,543 (2d Cir. Jan. 8, 1970); cf. Electronic Spe-
cialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937,947 (2d Cir. 1969).
160 Secs. (2.520)-(2.540) supra,
161 See sec. (2.530) supra.
162 See generally W. KNEPER, LumiA op COEoRAtE OFECERS AND DnEc-
TORS 7-10, 74-78 (1969).-
-6a Condec Corp. v. tunkenheimer Co., 43 Del. Ch. 353, 230 A.2d 769 (CI. 1967).
164 See, e.g., Northwest Indus., Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 711-13
(N.D. fI. 1969) (N.Y. law); Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (Sup. Ct
1964). But see Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 43 Del. Ch. 353, 230 A.2d 769
(C. 1967). See generally Arbudde, The Contiuuing Viability of the Business Judg-
ment Rule ar a Guide for Judicial Restraint, 35 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 652 (1967).
165 Sec. (2.740) infra.
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pany is well protected by economic, legal and structural safeguards.
Nothing seems to be wanting in this regard. Rather, the restraints
on them are, in practice, often inadequate to deal with self protec-
tion cloaked as corporate or shareholder protection.
H. Target Securityholders (2.700)
1. Interests and Alternatives (2.710).- The interest of holders
of target securities are essentially investment interests. They are
forced to make a prompt, complex and usually unanticipated deci-
sion that may importantly affect their holdings. They have to face
three basic alternatives: hold, sell or tender.
a. Hold (2.711).- They may retain their target securities.
Their future is in some doubt since they may wind up as minority
holders in a subsidiary controlled by the offeror. They may be
squeezed out through a later merger, liquidation or recapitaliza-
tion. Even if they continue, they may be apprehensive about how
well minority holders will fare in the subsidiary, or how well the
subsidiary will fare in view of possible business or management
changes.'66 Moreover, their securities will probably be less market-
able because of fewer public holders, resulting in stock exchange
delisting or market maker indifference. Their securities may well
decline in value after the Offer Period.
b. Sell (2.712).- They may sell in the trading market,
taking a known sum. If this is more than their cost, they face
an income tax (at long-term capital gain rates except for holdings
of less than 6 months, or in brokers' trading accounts) 167 and a
choice among reinvestment opportunities. They run the risk that
the offer price will be increased, or that the target securities will
rise in value after the offer.
c. Tender (2.713).- They may tender pursuant to the of-
fer. None, some, or all of the tenders may be accepted, depending
on the terms of the offer, the total number of tenders and, perhaps,
the discretion of the offeror (for example, to take more or less
than the minimum bid for). To the extent tenders are accepted,
in an exchange offer, they have securities of a new and perhaps
radically different issuer. If their tenders are partially taken up,
they have fragmentary holdings of two securities. (Any rejected
parts may be sold in the market, but by the time the takeups usu-
ally become known, in the Post-Offer Period, the price may have
166 For a discussion of some of the possible changes, see sec. (1.400) supra.
167 See note 45 supra.
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dropped significantly.) The taking up of tenders precipitates a
tax for the holder if it is a cash offer . 6  The same is true of an
exchange offer unless it offers solely voting stock and the offeror
winds up with at least 80 percent of the target company's voting
power and 80 percent of any nonvoting shares.169  There is the
further uncertainty, in an exchange offer, about the future value
of the offered securities.
The holder of target securities is thus interested in the terms
of the offer, the offeror's ability to perform (with respect to its
financial capacity and to obstacles erected by target management)
and its plans for the target company, and must make judgments
about the relative present and future values of the securities in-
volved and his own financial and tax status.
In addition, holders of target securities may have psychologi-
cal loyalties to the management or to the target corporate entity
(particularly if they are also employees) which they see threatened
by the offer. Their views toward the offeror operate more paradoxi-
cally. If they are impressed by the offeror and the prospects it
holds out for the target company, they are motivated to hold their
securities in order to enjoy the expected benefits. If enough holders
do this, the offer fails. Conversely, if they are frightened or alien-
ated by the offeror, they are likely to get out while the getting is
good, by tendering or by selling in the trading market (probably
to arbitrageurs); either disposition helps to assure the success of
the offer.
Target securityholders in a tender offer may also be deciding
who will manage the target company. 70 But this is of less import
to them as individuals than their investment decisions. If they sell
or tender, they are giving up their concern for the target company
along with their ownership of it.
Particular securityholders who are also part of the management
(or feel that they are) or have other special relations with the
company will have interests and concerns in these capacities. These
are considered elsewhere. 7'
2. Safeguards in Investment Decision (2.720).- Since the
target securityholder's big problem is a fast investment decision,
the most important safeguards for him are those which pertain to
his decision. These take several forms.
16 8 See sec. (2.124) supra.
169 For a discussion of some of these tax effects, see sec. (2.124) sapra
170 See Swanson, supra note 20, at 470-72.
'7' Secs. (2.600) supra, (2.900) infra.
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a. Infornation (2.721).- One important set of safeguards
is informational, and comes from the Williams Bill in a cash of-
fer172 and from the 1933 Act in an exchange offer.173  The prin-
cipal disclosures required are:
(1) The identity of the offeror.
(2) The terms of the offer.
(3) The source of financing if it is a cash offer.
(4) Complete financial data on the offeror and (so far as
available to the offeror) comparable data on the target company
in an exchange offer.
(5) The offeror's purposes and plans for the target company.174
(6) The offeror's ownership of, and rights to acquire, target
securities, and its trading in them in the 60 days before the offer.
(7) Arrangements and understandings as to target securities,
such as joint ventures, options, proxies and guaranties against loss.
(8) Similar information, at least in a cash offer, for each
member of any "group" acting with the offeror in the offer and
each of the offeror's officers, directors and controlling persons. 75
172Exchange Act § 14(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (Supp. IV, 1969); SEC Ex-
change Act Rule 14d-1(c), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1(c) (1969), reprinted in 2 CCH FED.
SEC L. REP. 5 26,885, at' 20,151 (referring to SEC Exchange Act Schedule 13D, 17
C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1969), reprinted in 2 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 26,853, at
20,107-4). For detailed examination, see A. BROMBERG, supra note 2, §§ 6.3 (400)-
(418), (450)-(468); Bromberg, Tender Offers, supra note 2, at 482-87, 493-502.
Broadly speaking, the Williams Bill covers cash offers for 2 percent or more of a
class of equity securities registered under the Exchange Act, if the offeror would then
own 10 percent or more of the class. Exchange Act §§ 14(d)(1), (8), 15 U.S.C. §
78n(d)(1), (8) (Supp. IV, 1969). Registered securities are those traded over the
counter (if held of record by 500 or more persons and if the issuer has assets of $1
million or more) and those listed on stock exchanges. Id. §§ 12 (a), (g), 15 U.S.C. §§
78 1(a), (g) (1964). For the exemption of insurance companies see id. § 14(d) (1),
15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (Supp. IV, 1969); id. § 12(g) (2) (G), 15 U.S.C. 781
(g) (2) (G) (1964). Equity securities are any but straight debt securities. Id. §
3 (a) (11), 15 U.S.C. § 78c (a) (11) (1964). For details on the coverage of the Wil-
liams Bill, see A. BROMBERG, supra note 2, §§ 6.3 (300)- (333); Bromberg, Tender Of-
fers, supra note 2, at 474-82.
173 Securities Act § 7 & Schedule A, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g, aa (1964); SEC Securities
Act Form S-1, General Instructions, 5 F, mentioned in 17 C.F.R. 239.11 (1969), re-
printed in 1 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 7122, at 6202; 8006, at 7015. For more detailed
examination, see Bromberg, Exchange Offers, supra note 2, at 808-09; MacLean, SEC
Registration and Filing Requirements for Mergers and Acquisitions, 4 MERGERS & Ac-
QUISITIONS 33, 41-44 (No. 2, Mar.-Apr. 1969).
Many of the Williams Bill terms and disclosure requirements are inapplicable to
registered exchange offers, but are usually complied with voluntarily under pressure
from the SEC staff examining the registration statement.
174 See text accompanying note 51 supra
175 Exchange Act § 14(d)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(2) (Supp. IV, 1969); SEC Ex-
change Act Rule 14d-1(a), (c) (4), 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14d(a), (c) (4) (1969), re-
printed in 2 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 26,886 at 20,151 (referring to SEC Exchange Act
Schedule 13D, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1969), reprinted in 2 CCH FED. SE)c. L REP.
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There is a requirement that comparable information filed with
the SEC be corrected by amendment when material changes occur
during the Offer Period.178 There is no express requirement that
target securityholders be notified of the change, even though it is
common knowledge that few tenders are made until the end of the
offer or the end of the pro rata period. Failure to publicize ma-
terial changes in the information in the offer may violate the anti-
fraud provisions when tenders are made on the basis of previously
circulated information which has become misleading.
The antifraud provisions help to assure the accuracy and com-
pleteness of the disclosure, and to give suitable relief if there is
material misrepresentation or omission. They extend not only to
the offer itself and accompanying publicity and solicitation, but
to earlier acts, like earnings forecasts or interim earnings reports,
which may influence target securityholders. 77 The target company
securityholders probably have standing to sue, whether or not they
have tendered.178
The SEC has diverse powers to use against violations of the
disclosure and antifraud provisions of the 1933 and 1934 ActsY.7 9
b. Market Yardstick (2.722).- The trading market itself
is a safeguard to the target securityholder; he can utilize it to sell
his holdings. At another level, it provides the primary yardstick
for his investment decisions: the market performance, past and
present, of the target security and of any securities being offered
(if the latter have a market history). 180 There is no requirement
that this information be furnished in a cash offer (but it is some-
times given voluntarily), although as a matter of administrative
5 26,853, at 20,107-4, of which Note B and Item 5 are relevant). For further dis-
cussion of the "group" concept, which is also found verbatim in Exchange Act §
13 (d) (3), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (3) (Supp. IV, 1969), enacted simultaneously, see note
96 supra and text accompanying notes 109-10 supra.
176 SEC Exchange Act Rule 14d-l(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1(b) (1969), reprinted
in 2 CCH FED. SEc L REP. 5 26,886, at 20,151.
17 7 See Butler Aviation Int'l, Inc. v. Comprehensive Designers, Inc., [Current
Binder) CCH FED. SEc. L REP. 5 92,557, at 98,543 (2d Cir. Jan. 8, 1970) (expressing
doubt about the materiality of the particular statements to the exchange offer, but
sustaining an injunction). See also text accompanying notes 60-62 supra.
178 Kahan v. Rosenstiel, tCurrent Binder) CCH FED. SEC. L REP. 5 92,589, at
98,685 (3d Cir. Feb. 20, 1970); A. BROMBERG, supra note 2, §§ 6.3(1020)-(1023);
Bromberg, Tender Offers, supra note 2, at 549-51.
'79 E.g., Securities Act § 8(d), 15 U.S.C. § 77h(d) (1964) (stop order for registra-
tion statement); id. § 20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (injunction); Exchange Act §
15(b)(5)(D), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(5)(D) (1964) (broker-dealer discipline for violation
of 1933 or 1934 Act); id. § 15(c)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(4) (compliance order). For
examples of SEC trading suspensions and injunction suits, see cases cited note 29 supra.
180 Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969).
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practice it is required in an exchange offer, usually in the form of
high and low prices of both securities for calendar quarters over
the past 2 or 3 years.
The antimanipulative provisions offer some protection that
these crucial current and historical market data are not distorted.""'
But the line between true supply-demand and manipulation is some-
times indistinct, and there is no absolute assurance to the investor
in a given case that some manipulation has not occurred.
In an exchange offer, information on the offeror's (and its as-
sociates') purchases of the offered securities might be useful to the
offerees (and to the enforcement authorities) in determining pos-
sible manipulation, but is not routinely required.
c. Time for Decision (2.723).- A cash offer (unless for
all the securities of a class) must be open for at least 10 days.182
This gives most securityholders a reasonable time to make their
investment decisions, to seek advice and to observe the trading
market reaction. It may be insufficient for a number of holders,
e.g., those who do not read the financial press, those whose mailing
addresses have changed or to whom no mailing is made, and
those traveling or otherwise out of touch.
Before the Williams Bill, cash offers could be made on a first-
come-first-served basis, creating a stampede effect and inhibiting
careful judgment by the target securityholder. Now all tenders in
the first 10 days of the Offer Period must be taken up pro rata. 88
A further safeguard for the holder who tenders in a cash offer
is the right to change his mind within the first 7 days of the Offer
Period and to withdraw his tender. 84 This is too short to do much
good, but it does in rare instances relieve a headlong action.
After the statuory withdrawal period, the tender is irrevocable if the
offer and transmittal letter so provide (as they inevitably do).
181 See id. (discussed in text accompanying note 115 supra). An offeror cannot buy
target securities in the trading market after the offer is announced. See SEC Exchange
Act Rule 10b-13, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-13 (1969), reprinted in 2 CCH FED. SEc. L.
REP. 5 26,752, at 20,071-4. And there are the general provisions against manipula-
tion in Exchange Act § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1964). See generally 3 L Loss, supra
note 53, at 1541-70.
182 This is the effect of the pro rata period discussed in text accompanying note
183 infra,
183 Exchange Act § 14(d)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (Supp. IV, 1969). For a full
discussion, see A. BROMBERG, supra note 2, §§ 6.3 (530)-(534); Bromberg, Tender Of-
fers, supra note 2, at 509-13.
184 Exchange Act § 14(d)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (Supp. IV, 1969). For a full
discussion, see A. BROMBERG, supra note 2, §§ 6.3(520)-(524); Bromberg, Tender Of-
fers, supra note 2, at 506-08.
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But the offeree has another chance to change his mind 60 days
after the start of the offer if his tender hasn't been taken up.l
Exchange offers commonly have provisions like the ones just
described for cash offers. They are not mandated by statute, al-
though the Williams Bill 8 6 serves as a standard of fairness which
the SEC staff reviewing an exchange offer registration can urge
very forcefully.
d. Improved Offer (2.724).- If the offeror raises the
ante during a cash offer, the Williams Bill requires that the higher
price be paid to holders who tendered before the increase as well
as to those who tendered after.8 7 The increase also starts a new
10-day period of pro rata takeups.188 There are no comparable
statutory requirements for exchange offers, but the result is usu-
ally the same.
3. Safeguards Against Discrimination (2.730).- We have
already noted under other headings several measures which operate
also to prevent discrimination among offerees. They are conven-
iently recapitulated here:
(1) Prohibitions on purchases by the offeror outside the offer,
e.g., at a higher price. 89
(2) Retroactive effect of a price increase during an offer. 9 ,0
185 Id.
2868ee Exchange Act § 14(d)(5)-(7), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5)-(7) (Supp. IV, 1969).
187 Id. § 14(d) (7), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (7) (Supp. IV, 1969). For detailed dis-
cussion, see A. BROMBERG, supra note 2, §§ 6.3 (550-554); Bromberg, Tender Offers,
supra note 2, at 513-15.
188 Exchange Act § 14(d) (6), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (6) (Supp. lV, 1969). For a de-
tailed discussion, see 4. BROMBERG, supra note 2, §§ 6.3(550)-(554); Bromberg, Ten-
der Offers, supra note 2, at 513-15.
189 SEC Exchange Act Rule l0b-13, 17 C.FR. § 240.10b-13 (1969), reprinted in
2 CCH FED. SEc. L REP. ! 26,752, at 20,071-4. There is apparently nothing to pre-
vent an offeror from buying at a higher price before the offer is announced. See au-
thorities cited note 40 supra & accompanying text. If it buys in the trading market,
it is apt to run up the price at which it has to make the offer. But this will not neces-
sarily be true if there is a considerable lapse of time, or if the prior purchases are out-
side the trading market. For example, Glen Alden bought a control block of Schenley
Industries from the Rosenstiel interests in 1968 at $80 per share and promised to
make an equivalent tender offer to all holders. The offer when made, consisted of
cash, debentures, and warrants. For allegations that it was worth less than $80 per
share and that there were misrepresentations, nondisclosures and other Rule 10b-5
violations, see Kahan v. Rosenstiel, [Current Binder) CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5
92,589, at 98,685 (3d Cir. Feb. 20, 1970), wherein the Third Circuit held that plaintiff
had stated a cause of action for attorney's fees, claiming that the offer had been improved
twice as a result of his efforts. Underlying this was a holding that plaintiff's original
attack on the offer stated a cause of action even though he was not a buyer or seller of
securities.
190Exchange Act § 14(d)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (Supp. IV, 1969). For a dis-
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(3) Pro rata takeups for first 10 days.'91
(4) Disclosure of "arrangements" and "purposes and plans"
which would include special benefits for target management. 192
Yet another antidiscrimination provision is the ban on short
tendering. A person is barred from tendering pursuant to the offer
more target securities than he owns. 193 It is no longer legal for
more sophisticated and daring investors to try to beat the pro rata
takeup requirements by tendering excess amounts of securities, or to
take advantage of the offeror to this extent. They can, however,
sell short in the trading market at a price that may approximate
the offer price.
There are also the state law condemnations of sale of control
at a premium,' which may occur in connection with a tender of-
fer. 95
4. Safeguards Against Target Management Self-Interest
(2.740).- We observed earlier that there may be a cleavage be-
tween the interests of target company management and those of the
securityholders. 96 Management's own interest may lead it in either
direction, i.e., to oppose an offer which is beneficial to share-
holders, or support one which is not. In the first case it is likely to
be because management fears ouster, in the second because it has
been promised continuity and perhaps increases in salaries, options
and other benefits.
State law fiduciary principles are operative in this area, but
with unpredictable effectiveness. 17  The theoretical standard is
strict impartiality, 9 ' and devotion to the corporate-shareholder wel-
cussion, see A. BROMBERG, supra note 2, §§ 6.3(550)-(554); Bromberg, Tender Offers,
rupra note 2, at 513-15.
191 Exchange Act § 14(d) (6), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (6) (Supp. IV, 1969). For a
discussion, see A. BROMBERG, supra note 2, §§ 6.3 (530)-(534); Bromberg, Tender Of-
fers, supra note 2, at 509-13.
192 See text accompanying notes 174-75 supra. See also cases cited note 204
infra.
193 SEC Exchange Act Rule 10b-4, 17 C.F.RL § 240.10b-4 (1964), reprinted in 2
CCH FED. SEc. L REP. 5 26,742, at 20,061-2. See A. BROMBERG, supra note 2, §
6.3(660); Bromberg, Tender Offers, supra note 2, at 528-30.
194 See, e.g., Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955); W. CARY, supra
note 158, at 827-32. But see Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572 (2d
Cir. 1962).
1 95 See note 189 supra.
196 Sec. (2.610) supra.
197 See secs. (2.610), (2.630) supra.
198 Northwest Indus., Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 712-13 (N.D.
in. 1969).
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fare. But this is too much to expect with any consistency in the
world of affairs, and we must usually settle for a good bit less.
Federal, and perhaps state, securities law requires disclosure of
relevant facts. The offeror must reveal "arrangements" and "pur-
poses and plans."' Target management must state the "reasons"
for its recommendations. 20 0  Such disclosure, honestly made, paves
the way for enforcement of state law duties. Material misrepre-
sentation or omission, if it can be detected, invokes the antifraud
provisions and a wide variety of possible remedies. The bar on
purchases by the offeror outside the offer may reinforce state law
restrictions on special consideration to management.20 1
If management tenders its own target securities, or sells them in
the trading market, with knowledge of undisclosed material infor-
mation about the company, it violates Rule 10b-5 and may be held
to account. 02  Normally, this would be negative information about
the target company, encouraging bailout before the news is pub-
lic.203 Nondisclosure of information about a better offer for some
or all of the target securities or of special benefits for management,
may also violate Rule lOb-5.2°4  In the context of a tender offer,
such actions would also violate section 14(e) of the 1934 Act.205
In a broader sense, the offer itself is a safeguard against
target management self-interest or incompetence.206
1 9 9 See cases cited note 51 & text accompanying notes 174-75, 192 supra.
200 Exchange Act § 14(d)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(4) (Supp. IV, 1969). See text
accompanying note 114 supra.
201 See cases cited note 194 supra.
202 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), injunction denied on remand, [Current Binder] CCH
FED. SEc. L REP. 5 92,572, at 98,584 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 1970); Astor v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 306 F. Supp. 1333 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
203 See Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d
78 (1969).
2 04 SEC v. Skagit Valley Tel. Co., SEC Litigation Release Nos. 3390 (Dec. 9,
1965), 3393 (Dec. 21, 1965), 3483 (Apr. 8, 1966) (W.D. Wash. 1965-66), dis-
cussed in 32 SEC ANN. REP. 116 (1966) ($394 thousand restitution to offerees from
offeror, target company and its insiders); SEC v. Fruit of the Loom, Inc., SEC Litigation
Release Nos. 1923 (Feb. 20, 1961), 1938 (Mar. 10, 1961) (S.D.N.Y. 1961), dis-
cussed in 27 SEC ANN. REP. 92-93 (1961); Fleischer & Mundheim, supra note 2, at
343-44. The disclosure required for change of board control without shareholder vote
[Exchange Act § 14 (f), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(f) (Supp. IV, 1969); SEC Exchange Act Rule
14f-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14f-1 (1969), reprinted in 2 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 26,888,
at 20,153] may be a tipoff of special benefits to target company management.
205 Exchange Act § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (Supp. IV, 1969).
206Manne, Salute to "Raiders", Barron's, Oct. 23, 1967, at 1, col. 1, arguing also
that tender offers benefit the economy as a whole. For an amplification of these
arguments, see Manne, Cash Tender Offers for Shares - A Reply to Chairman Cohen,
1967 DuKE LJ. 231.
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5. Safeguards Against Third Party Recommendations (2.750)'.
Statements from the offeror in support of the offer, and from
the target company in support or opposition, are governed by dis-
closure requirements and antifraud rules already commented
upon.207 Recommendations of third persons are subject to the
antifraud provisions and, in the case of a cash offer, to substantive
SEC rulemaking. To date all oral recommendations are exempted,
and so are many written ones.20 8 The third persons most likely to be
making recommendations are brokers. Motivated by the attractive
commissions in the offer,209 and the possibility of another com-
mission if the proceeds of a cash offer are reinvested through them,
the brokers naturally tend to become advocates for the offer.
Target securityholders are informed of the commissions in the of-
fer and may thus be alerted to possible bias of brokers.
6. Safeguards Against Success of the Offer (2.760).- So far
as the target securityholder feels threatened by the offer, he has
several safeguards. He with enough of his fellow holders can de-
feat the offer by holding onto his securities. There are serious weak-
nesses in this safeguard. One is the difficulty of collective action
by numerous holders. Another is the perverse logic at work: the
more threatening the offer seems, the more likely the holder is to
help it succeed, either by tendering or by selling in the trading
market to someone who is likely to tender. A third is the uncer-
tainty about the prospects of the offeror as the offer proceeds. If
a holder knew with any clarity what fellow holders were doing,
he might be able to make better predictions about the success of the
offer (e.g., whether the minimum number of shares were likely
to be tendered). He can follow the volume figures in the financial
press if the target security is listed on an exchange. But he has
no way of knowing what off-board transactions are adding to this
volume. And he can rarely know where the selling is coming
from and how much of it is reselling by purchasers taking a quick
profit from the impetus of the offer.
All the devices available to the target company to defeat the
offer which were discussed earlier210 are relevant here. Target
securityholders opposing an offer will usually be led by target com-
20 7 Sec. (2.721) supra.
208 For detailed discussion, see A. BROMBERG, supra note 2, § 6.3(650); Bromberg,
Tender Oilers, supra note 2, at 527-28.
209 See secs. (1.220), (2.130) supra.
210 Secs. (1.500), (2.520) supra.
TENDER OFFERS
pany management with similar views.211 Indeed, target company
management probably has a duty to oppose an offer which is
detrimental to the company or its shareholders.21
A target company securityholder, whether or not he tenders,
probably has standing to sue for violation of various antifraud and
disclosure clauses of federal securities laws.2"3
7. Safeguards Against Assumption of Control and Against
Economic Injury (2.770).- The techniques to keep the offeror
from taking control are principally the ones described earlier in
connection with the target company's viewpoint. 14 Many of them
call for securityholder approval. Moreover, there is yet another dis-
closure requirement of the Williams Bill applicable to a change
of control of the board of directors by arrangement or understand-
ing (e.g., with target company management) without a share-
holder vote. Information on the newcomers, equivalent to that in
a proxy statement for their election as directors must be sent to
shareholders 10 days in advance. 15
The protections against economic injury are essentially the
same as for the target company.218 Cooperation of securityholders
may be needed to implement them.
8. Safeguards Through the Legal Profession (2.780).- It will
be a rare securityholder who will take the time, trouble and ex-
pense to press his legal rights, for example, against the offeror or
the target company management. His interest is simply too small.
The devices which may make it feasible for him to do so (apart
from subsidy by the offeror or target company) are the class ac-
tion and the derivative suit. These, in turn, are largely energized
by the possibility that attorneys for the securityholder will get
court-awarded fees based on the benefits procured for the entire
group of securityholders or for the corporation.2 17 Like it or not,
these must be recognized as necessary to make effective the security-
211 See sec. (2.610) supra.
2 12 Northwest Indus., Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 712 (N.D. Ill.
1969).
2 13 See note 189 supra.
214 Sec. (2.530) supra.
215 Exchange Act § 14(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(f) (Supp. IV, 1969); SEC Exchange
Act Rule 14f-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14f-1 (1969), reprinted in 2 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
5 26,888, at 20,153.
216 See sec. (2.540) supra.
2 17 See A. BROMBERG, supra note 2, § 9.3.
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holders' safeguards.218  The courts seem increasingly to acknowledge
this as they liberalize the right to recover fees.219
9. Critique (2.790).- The target securityholder, like the tar-
get company and its management, seems more than adequately
protected against the success of the offer. But he is something less
than adequately assured a chance to accept the offer. The manage-
ment of his own company may keep him from knowing of it by
refusing the mailing list to the tender offeror. A well-balanced set
of protections would assure him a copy of the offer, by requiring
the target company to transmit the offer at the offeror's expense,
or to furnish the mailing list in quickly usable form to the offeror.2 20
The offeror might spurn the mailing, because of the expense in-
volved. Since a major claim of the tender offer is its nondiscrim-
inatory character, a mandatory mailing may be in order, perhaps
including air mail or telegraph to more remote holders if the pro
rata period is as short as the minimum statutory 10 days.221
Nothing in this suggestion need spoil the chance of a cash of-
feror to make a surprise offer. Although advance notice would
benefit the target company and its management, and perhaps the
target securityholders, it is probably out-weighed by the additional
price the offeror would almost certainly have to pay. The demand
for mailing or furnishing a list could be made on publication of
the offer, and complied with in relatively few days.
Although market-information data on target securities is readily
available in most situations, it would be appropriate to insist that
the cash offeror include this (say by quarterly price ranges) in the
offer. (The SEC as a matter of practice usually requires this in an
exchange offer.) The burden of compliance would be negligible
and the information might be valuable to the holder's investment
decision.
218 Parallel, but not necessarily equivalent, enforcement may come from the SEC,
the state securities administrators, the target company or the offeror.2 19 See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., [Current Binder] CCH FED. Sac L. REP.
5 92,556, at 98,532 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1970) (for violation of proxy rules); Kahan v. Rosen-
stiel, [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 92,589, at 98,685 (3d Cir. Feb. 20,
1970).
220By virtue of SEC Exchange Act Rule 14 a-7, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-7 (1969),
reprinted in 2 CCH FED. SEc. L. RaEP. 5 26,861, at 20,116, an opposition proxy solid-
tor is given these alternatives. Management has the option of which to furnish. A
requirement of this sort in the tender offer context would obviously help the of-
feror as well, but the securityholder's interest justifies it. See sec. (2.150) supra.
221 N.Y. STocK EXCaI. Co. MANuAL A-180 (1963), and AMERICAN STocK ExCH.
Co. GuIDE § 904 (1968), provide for airmail or telegrams, and for telegraphic tenders
through banks or brokers.
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A strong argument can be made that target securityholders are
entitled to a recommendation from their management. Nothing
like this is now required, although there is sure to be a recommen-
dation if management is opposed. Despite its self-interest, man-
agement is probably in a better position than anyone else to evaluate
the offer and to disclose any information on the target company,
such as current accomplishments, projects or earnings, which might
materially affect the value of the target securities.2
While the pro rata acceptance of early tenders has appealing
elements of fairness, it often leaves the small shareholder with
tag ends returned to him, maybe 27 shares out of 100. Requiring
or permitting small tenders (say 100 shares or less) to be accepted
in full might be fairer, and would certainly be more convenient
to the small holder.223
There have been suggestions to prohibit the broker's extra
commission which tends to bias his recommendations in favor
of the offer.Y- In my judgment, disclosure is a sufficient protec-
tor here, as it is in underwritten sales of securities, where masses
of account executives are similarly mobilized by special compensa-
tion.
In the aftermath of the offer, the minority holders of target
securities - those who did not tender or sell, and those whose
tenders were not taken up - face the possibility of squeezeout.
The form may be merger into the offeror or one of its subsidiaries,
or sale of assets to any of them, followed by dissolution 225  There
is some inequity in forcing a securityholder to give up his invest-
ment, and perhaps pay a tax, after he has chosen not to tender.
However, it is not clear to me that his status should be protected
at the expense of majority voting rights. On the other hand, it is
2 22 See Fleischer & Mundheim, supra note 2, at 349 & authorities cited therein.
223 There would have to be some mechanism to prevent the one thousand-share-
holder from submitting 10 tenders of 100 shares each to take unfair advantage of the
minimum round lot.
224 See, e.g., PLI CORPoRAT LAW & PRAcTicE TRANscRrPT, TEXAS GULF SUL-
PHUR - INsIDER DIscLosuRE PROBLEMS 490-500 (Series No. 1, 1968) (A. Fleischer
& J. Flom eds.) (comments of W. McNeil Kennedy).
225 For the range of squeezeout techniques, see F. O'NEAL & J. DERWIN, EXPUL-
SION OR OPPRESSION OF BUSINESS AssociATES 41-98 (1961). For examples in which
causes of action were stated under SEC Exchange Act Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(1969), see Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cit. 1967), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 970 (1967); Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Co., 241 F. Supp. 369 (D. Del.
1965). For an appraisal proceeding on the same facts, see Poole v. N.V. Deli Maat-
schappij, 243 A.2d 67 (Del. 1968) (prior opinion, 224 A.2d 260 (Del. 1966) ), motion
to reopen denied, 257 A.2d 241 (Del. Ch. 1969) (value not proved to be higher than
amount offered in tender offer and in squeezeout merger).
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dear that he should be entitled to fair consideration if he is
squeezed out. Most states try to assure this by providing appraisal
rights which he may invoke if he is dissatisfied with the consid-
eration offered in the squeezeout transaction.220  But sometimes the
appraisal right is denied in a sale of assets even though it is granted
for a merger.22 The appraisal right is not always protective in
practice. Time limits may be too short for many shareholders, and
there are technicalities and pitfalls along the road. The final
valuation is unpredictable. A better procedure is probably needed,
although as much in ordinary mergers as for those following ten-
der offers. Despite the flaws of appraisal, it does seem uncon-
scionable to bar it in asset sales. And in any case, if a squeezeout
occurs shortly after a tender offer, say within a year, the price
should be no less than that paid in the offer.
I. Other Target Company Securityholders (2.800)
1. Interests (2.810).- Holders of target company securities
not bid for in the offer (e.g., nonconvertible preferred stock and
debt, or nonvoting common) are nonetheless potentially affected
by it, for example, through possible changes in the financial con-
dition of the company, imperilling their dividend or interest pay-
ments. On the other hand, their protective covenants may be strong
enough to assuage any concern.
Holders of securities convertible into a common being bid for
if the convertible is not itself being bid for - have a more
immediate problem. They have roughly the same alternatives as
holders of target securities. But, in order to tender, they must con-
vert and sacrifice their senior position (and perhaps higher yield)
in the event the tender is not taken up. Holders of warrants to
purchase target common stock are in a similar position, although
they sacrifice leverage (rather than seniority and income) in order
to be in a position to tender.
2. Safeguards (2.820).- The safeguards of these security-
holders include resort to the market to sell their securities, although
the market is unlikely to be favorable if it shares their judgment
that the offer is a threat to them. But the market should itself be
at least short run favorable for some securityholders - those with
226 E.g., ABA-ALl MODEL Bus. CoRP. Acr §§ 73, 74 (1967).
227 Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (1953), as amended, (Supp. 1968),
with id. § 271. See Hariton v. Arco Electronics, Inc., 40 Del. Ch. 326, 182 A.2d 22
(Ch. 1962), affd, 41 Del. Ch. 74, 188 A.2d 123 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
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warrants to buy target securities or with senior issues convertible
into target securities - because the trading market prices for their
securities should reflect the premium in the offer itself.
Securityholders may have contractual protections in charters or
indentures, which will minimize injury from the offeror if it takes
control. These often take the form of minimum surplus require-
ments for dividends or indenture approval for borrowings above a
certain level.
State law obligations of due care in management, and prohibi-
tions on self-dealing give some additional protection to security-
holders. At best, however, these are likely to be enforceable by
stockholders but not by debt holders, since only the former nor-
mally have capacity to sue for breach of a duty to the corporation.228
Corporate duties may be enforced by creditors in extreme instances,
when a receiver or bankruptcy trustee is appointed, or perhaps
by means of a creditors' bill.
The disclosure requirements described earlier ° are ostensibly
beamed at target securityholders. But they convey information
helpful to other securityholders in their judgments. Probably the
most important is the statement of the offeror's purposes and plans
for the target company.
It is unlikely that these securityholders have any standing to
sue for violation of the securities laws. They seem to be outside
the zone of intended protection. If their vote is later sought for
charter amendment, merger, indenture revision or other action, they
have the safeguard of their voting power, of the proxy rules (if
applicable), and of standing to sue for violations in- the solicita-
tion.
3. Restraints (2.830) .- There are no special restraints for this
group of securityholders.
4. Critique (2.840)- Holders of target company securities
not sought in a tender offer are largely unprotected by the securi-
ties laws from injury through a tender offer. They have moderate
protections in state law, but these turn heavily on their particular
charter or contract rights. Since these holders are not directly
involved in the offer, it is not at all certain that they need greater
protections than they now have.
22 8 See -Sutton v. Reagan & Gee, 405 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1966);
R. BAKER & W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON COUoRATioNs 619-22 (3d ed.
unabridg. 1959).
229 Sec. (2.721) supra.
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J. Target Company Constituents (2.900)
1. Interests (2.910).- The constituents of the target company
may have interests analogous to those of comparable bodies in
the offeror described earlier. 30  Employees are often worried
about less generous wage scales or benefits paid by the offeror. Em-
ployee profit sharing or pension trusts may come under the control
of the offeror and suffer a change in investment policy or diversion
of assets. Local communities where the target company has plants
may be apprehensive that the plants will be run from a distant
headquarters heedless of local problems or, worse yet, dosed down
entirely with loss of jobs, income, taxes and property values.
There may be similar apprehension that corporate headquarters
which is a local ornament, will be moved to another city.
2. Safeguards (2.920).- The available safeguards appear to
be like those for constituents of the offeror, described earlier.
23 1
Community pressures may manifest themselves in effective ways.232
3. Restraints (2.930).- There are no special restraints on the
members of these groups, as such, relative to a tender offer.
4. Critique (2.940).- The comments made earlier in the dis-
cussion of offeror constituents are applicable here.233
K. Third Persons and the Market (2.1000)
1. Interests (2.1010).- Persons unrelated to either company
may have an interest in the offer (and its outcome) through the
trading markets. These include prospective purchasers of securi-
230 Sec. (2.410) supra.
231 Sec. (2.420) supra.
232 See, e.g., the promises of IT&T in the Hartford Fire acquisition, described in
note 8 supra (obviously made in response to some felt need and pressure, including
opposition to the acquisition from local insurance agents); Wall Street Journal, Jan.
27, 1969, at 21, col. 3 (Southwest ed.) (union officials were urging the rejection of
General Foods' offer to buy Rountree). See also Bath Indus., Inc. v. Blot, 305 F.
Supp. 526 (E.D. Wis. 1969), wherein a group of big shareholders were enjoined from
proceeding with plans to take control of the board of directors of their company. Their
violation was failure to file pursuant to Exchange Act § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)
(Supp. IV, 1969), which is very similar to the filing requirement for a cash tender of-
feror. See Exchange Act § 14(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (Supp. IV, 1969). Their prin-
cipal objective was to change chief executives, but the court made quite a point of their in-
tent to move the corporate headquarters from Milwaukee to New York. Judge
Reynolds gave a due to his feelings on matters of such local interest by taking judicial
notice that Wisconsin is the most civilized state in the Union. 305 F. Supp. at 533
n.4. The case underlines the value to the target company of the broad venue provi-
sions of Exchange Act § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1964), which will often permit it to
sue in its home district. See also the Jones & Laughlin union demands, and the vespoure,
summarized in note 8 supra.
233 Sec. (2.440) supra.
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ties of either company, whether for arbitrage, other speculation,
or long-term investment. They include prospective sellers (other
than existing securityholders who were considered earlier);2 4
these persons think the securities are overpriced and hope to make
a profit on selling short. Still different persons - certain arbi-
trageurs - are prospective buyers of target securities and concur-
rent short sellers of the offeror's securities. Also interested are
brokers who, as noted above, 3 may earn a double commission on
tenders and perhaps more.
Possible concerns of the market relate to the effect on other se-
curities (e.g., in the same industries, or related companies) of the
price fluctuations of the securities of the offeror and the target
company, or on the availability of credit for market transactions.
There is an effect on the value of existing portfolios containing
securities of the offeror or the target company and, at least in the
case of open-end investment companies, on the prices at which
their own shares buy and sell, and on their performance records.
The specific interests of these various persons are quite diver-
gent. Their common concern should be that the trading market is
free from manipulation, that it has enough information to avoid
unnecessary bias230 and that there are no more impediments to the
smooth functioning of the market than are absolutely necessary to
protect other interests.
2. Safeguards (2.1020).- At least in the common interest
just postulated, the chief safeguards for third persons are the dis-
closure, antifraud and antimanipulation provisions of the securities
laws. Nonetheless, it is an open question whether any but actual
buyers and sellers have standing to sue for violations.
Momentary trading halts by the stock exchanges when a tender
offer is announced have some protective effect.2 3 7
3. Restraints (2.1030).- There are no restraints in this area
that are peculiar to tender offers, other than the prohibition on
short tendering.238 Persons in this group are governed by general
234 Secs. (2.300), (2.700), (2.800).
2 35 Secs. (1.220), (2.130) & text accompanying note 209 supra.
2 36 Cf. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848, 851-52 (2d Cir. 1968)
(en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (trading market investors should have
equal access to material information and to the rewards of market transactions).
237 See sec. (1.320) suPra.
2 3 8 See text accompanying note 193 supra.
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market restraints, such as margin limitations on purchases239 and
prohibitions on down-tick short sales.2 40
4. Critique (2.1040).- I see no glaring gaps in protection for
the trading market. Perhaps there should be a brief trading halt
when a previously unannounced offer is made for an over-the-
counter target security. In all offers, there is a need for prompt
announcement in the Post-Offer Period of how many tenders, if
any, will be taken up, so that future trading may take this into
account. Because of the difficulty in tallying tenders, no fixed
deadline for publicizing the results would be feasible. An argument
could be advanced for periodic statements, during the Offer Period,
of the number of tenders received. The slow mechanics of tallying
might make this information unreliable or stale when released.
And it could be misleading if, as seems true in most cases, tenders
concentrate at the end of the Offer Period or of the interval for pro
rata takeups.241
III. CONCLUSIONS - WHAT TO Do ABOUT TENDER OFFERS
A. Introduction (3.100)
We have looked at the tender offer from the vantage points of
the diverse groups that may be affected by it. To gain a different
and more summary perspective, we will draw conclusions from
other lines of view which intersect those already considered:
(1) Competition and Public Interest.
(2) Investor Protection .
(3) Corporate Integrity (an admittedly vague phrase).
Under each of these, we will inquire whether the tender offer
should be outlawed, regulated, modified or left as is. In most
instances it will be helpful to distinguish between the offer itself,
and its possible consequences. 242
B. The Good and the Bad (3.200)
A tender offer may turn out well for everyone. It may be
smoothly negotiated and supported by target management. The
price may attract the desired securities. The trading market level of
23 9 Exchange Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 78g (Supp. IV, 1969).
2 40 SEC Exchange Act Rule 10a-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10a-1 (1969), reprinted in 2
CCH FED. SEc. L REP. 5 26,733, at 20,059.
241 See text accompanying note 6 supra.
242 For a list of the possible consequences, see sec. (1.400) supra.
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the untendered securities, and of the offeror's securities, may rise.
A harmonious and profitable business relation between the two
companies may ensue, with benefits for employees and other con-
stituents, and without injury to competition in the economy.
Or, the offer may turn out badly for everyone. The target
management may be alienated. The price may be too high, attract-
ing tenders, but paid in the form of dubious securities, which later
decline in value. Securities not tendered also drop. The two com-
panies may engage in further expensive struggle over management
and policies, or (when management is changed) be operationally
incompatible, with loss of business and morale.
Most of the time, of course, a tender offer will not be all good
or all bad, but a mixture. Very often, perhaps most of the time,
it will be impossible to tell in advance how it will turn out.
C. The Central Issue (3.300)
The tender offer has many aspects, as we have seen. The one
that emerges as most important is that the tender offer is a market
technique - as distinct from a corporate procedure of resolutions
and votes - for acquiring control through securities purchases and
for combining businesses. If this is carried out with the concur-
rence of target management, the result is similar to other acquisi-
tion techniques and presents no unusual issues. It is the fact that
it can be done over the heads of target management that raises the
difficult questions. Our problem then is to examine a market de-
vice which is capable of consolidating control through share owner-
ship (usually from noncontrolling scraps) and leading to internal
business changes without the consent, and maybe even over the
opposition, of the officers and directors of the target company.
D. Competition and Public Interest (3.400)
I have already disclaimed expertise in the antitrust field.2 43
But I think it tolerably dear that the issue here is whether the
tender offer is more of a threat to competition than other forms
of combination. Or, to put it a bit differently, is an acquisition
without target management acquiescence likely to be more anticom-
petitive than one with it? Perhaps the answer is yes, because of
the ease and speed with which the acquisition may be accom-
243 Note 90 supra.
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plished.2 "4 Perhaps the answer is no, because of the greater likeli-
hood that management would fight a competitor, even a tenuous
one, than a neutral. But I think the answer is really unknown.
Without some clear evidence that tender offers are anticom-
petitive in a way that mergers are not, I see no justification for out-
lawing, regulating or modifying the tender offer. Whatever is
necessary to satisfy antitrust policy should apply equally to mer-
gers, tender offers and other forms of combination.
Many of the challenges to the tender offer have come from
opponents of the conglomerates, who have been major users of the
technique. 45 Without attempting an evaluation of the conglom-
erate trend, I submit that the remedy, if one is needed, is a more
comprehensive sweep of the antitrust laws rather than a curtailment
of the tender offer.
Apart from competition and conglomeration, there are a num-
ber of other public interest factors in a tender offer, including
those of employees, consumers and local communities. But their
concerns are more with the possible consequences of a tender offer248
than with the offer itself, since any of the consequences might
occur without a change of share ownership or management. Their
concerns are not to be sneered at, and deserve to be heard. But they
have ways to be heard now" 7 and do not merit a ban on tender
offers (which may benefit these interests as often as they harm
them). Nor do I think they call for some kind of governmental
qualitative review of tender offers, unless we are willing to have
the same review (a) for control changes by private purchase, mar-
ket accumulation, merger or asset sale, and (b) for internal busi-
ness changes by any of these means or by management alone.
This would be a radical departure from private enterprise as we
know it.
E. Investor Protection (3.500)
There are real problems for investors in tender offers, prin-
cipally confusion,248 market turbulence, the need to make a rela-
tively quick decision under some pressure, and the risk that another
244 Sometimes, perhaps, the possibility of acquisition without management acquies-
cence coerces management into acquiescence.
245 The anticonglomerate movement has taken many forms. See Hamilton, Some
Reflections on Cash Tender Offer Legislation, 15 N.Y.L.F. 269, 270-71 (1969).
2 46 See sec. (1.400) supra.
247 See secs. (2.400), (2.900) supra.
2 4 8 See Kelly, supra note 34, at 628.
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decision would have been more profitable.249  And there are re-
wards, notably the premium offered to target securityholders, and
the stimulus to better performance by management of potential
target companies. In other contexts federal law is wisely com-
mitted to a policy of investor choice, based upon relevant informa-
tion. The same policy is valid here, and is adequately imple-
mented by the Williams Bill for cash offers and the 1933 Act
registration requirements for exchange offers. The former pro-
vides some guarantees against precipitate action, and against discrim-
ination250 which are a departure from other securities laws, but
which are worth keeping to see if they prove their apparent worth.
States which essay qualitative review of securities sold within their
borders can apply their standards to securities issued in exchange
offers.25' So may the stock exchanges.252
From the investor's corner, there is no reason to abolish the
tender offer, and considerable reason to encourage it. Nor is there
any good reason, in my judgment, to subject it to much further
regulation. Several changes would improve investor protection:
(1) Compulsory mailing of the offer to all record holders of
target securities.2t
(2) Inclusion in a-cash offer of historical and current market
price data on target securities.254
(3) Full, rather than pro rata, takeup of small tenders. 55
(4) Balancing the debate in a contested exchange offer by
muzzling the target company or, preferably, unmuzzling the of-
feror.255
(5) Assurance that nontendering holders of target securities
who are squeezed out shortly after the offer will receive no less
than the offer price257
(6) Early announcement of results of the offer.2 58
249 See secs. (2.710)-(2.713) supra.
25 0 See secs. (2.723), (2.730) supra.
251 See the Ohio and Wisconsin authorities cited note 129 supra.
2 52 See Wall Street Journal, Apr. 18, 1969, at 3, col. 1 (Eastern ed.) (N.Y. Stock
Exch. refuses to list exchange offer debentures of General Host Corp. and NVF Co.
because of insufficient pro forma earnings after debt charges).
2 53 See secs. (2.150), (2.790) supra.
254 See sec. (2.790) supra.
2551d
2 56 See sec. (2.150) supra.
257 See sec (2.790) supra.
258 See sec. (2.1040) supra.
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(7) Perhaps extension of the Williams Bill to target insurance
companies.25
(8) Perhaps a required recommendation of target management
to holders of target securities.
260
F. Corporate Integrity - The Offeror (3.600)
I see a need for better protection of offeror securityholders
against improvident tender offers. This is no reason to ban ten-
der offers or to review them administratively. At the least, more
disclosure to offeror securityholders is needed, including a prompt
notice of the offer with pro forma statement of earnings per share
in the event of success.261 And there is something to be said for
a kind of appraisal right (based on preannouncement values) for
offeror securityholders, although the difficulties may outweigh the
advantages.26 2
G. Corporate Integrity - The Target Company (3.700)
As a device for obtaining control of the target company, the
tender offer has some distinct superiorities over other methods. It
is nondiscriminatory, assuming that it is adequately communicated
to all holders of target securities, with reasonable times for them to
tender and be taken up pro rata. This eliminates the troublesome
premium to a control group for its holdings. It is just the equal
opportunity that critics have called for,263 with all holders having
the right to share the premium proportionally.
The tender offer may be the solution to another classic problem:
the separation of ownership and control. Berle and Means, the
early observers and critics of this development in large corporations,
distinguished (among others) private ownership, majority owner-
ship, minority control and management control. 2 4  The history of
most publicly held corporations in the United States has been a
progression in this direction, as a result of going public, growing
in size, and reducing proportional holdings through additional fi-
nancing and acquisitions. The trend is largely one-way. The de-
259 See seC. (2.550) supra.
26o See sec. (2.790) supra.
261 See sec. (2.340) supra.
262 Id.
2 63 See Andrews, The Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of
Shares, 78 HARV. L. REV. 505 (1965).
2 64 A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
94 (1934).
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vice most likely to reverse the trend is the tender offer. It is
commonly made for a target company in which management hold-
ings are small, and is virtually the only way to assemble from
fragmented holdings a minority control block of securities or a
majority block. Insofar as this adds legitimacy and reduces di-
vergency between ownership and control, the tender offer is benef-
icent 266
In these two aspects - sharing of the control premium and
possible rejoining of ownership and control - the tender offer
provides integrity for the target company. In another sense, it de-
prives the target company of integrity by short circuiting its duly
chosen management. But the management is chosen by the share-
holders and can hardly have a higher claim than the new holder of
those shares.
The undermining of target management by a tender offer is not
a matter to be taken lightly. But it hardly justifies any sort of
prohibition on the tender offer, or any sort of government review. 67
Nor does it support any sort of requirement that tender offers be
subject to veto by target management. This would turn a market
action into a corporate procedure. It would give management a
restriction on transfer of outstanding securities26 that is wholly un-
warranted when holders want to sell. Further, it would nullify
voting rights at the one point they are likely to be valuable to the
small holder, i.e., when someone is willing to buy his securities at
a premium to get the vote.
Target management already has abundant weapons to fight a
tender offer. The SEC filing requirements subject it to question-
able delay in beginning the fight against a surprise offer. Ad-
vance filing is reasonable if the target company has advance notice.
In other cases, while a little delay may encourage a cooler response,
26 5 See, e.g., Vance, Is Your Company a Take-Over Target?, 47 HARV. Bus. REV. 93
(May-June 1969).
266 If the offeror is a company suffering from the same split of ownership and
control, the problem has not been cured, merely shifted to another entity. But, at
least, it exists in one place less than before.
267 A reasonable exception would be fiduciary institutions or regulated industries
where the government already has some sort of review of management personnel, or
some special interest in control changes. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C.A. § 1378(a) (5) (Supp.
1970), amended in 1969 to require Civil Aeronautics Board approval of acquisition of
control of an air carrier by any person. Previously, the provision applied only to control
by another carrier or person engaged in aeronautics. Ten percent ownership is presumed
to be control unless the Board finds otherwise.
268 Transferability of shares is a hallmark of the corporation. It has been legislated
into virtual negotiability, first by the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, and more recently
(and completely) by UCC § 8-105 (1).
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fairness favors letting target management move at once and file
later.2 69
The legal test to distinguish management's personal interest
from the securityholders' or corporate interest - and thus to en-
force their fiduciary duties - is not very discriminating.270 A bet-
ter, more relevant test is whether opposition moves are reasonably
calculated to produce a higher market value for the securities.27 1
H. Summation (3.800)
Some improvements suggested above can be made in the tender
offer and still preserve its great virtues. Beyond this, further ef-
forts to regulate - by qualitative standards, corporate procedures
or administrative review - would strengthen the hands of target
management, if only through deterrence and delay of offers.-72
But they would undermine other cherished arrangements which
make the tender offer work: free transferability of securities, voting
rights for securityholders, and a market economy.
2 6 9 See sec. (2.550) supra.
2TO See cases cited note 106 supra.
27 1 See sec. (2.5 60) supra.
272 On the effectiveness of delay, see sec. (2.527) supra.
